International Commercial Arbitration in Asia: A Fuller Account

USyd Prof Vivienne Bath and I are writing a chapter on this (and Mediation) for the Oxford Handbook of International Trade Law in Asia (co-edited by Prof Julien Chaisse et al). Due to the tight word limit we move here some of our material, for readers interested in delving more deeply or widely into the topics compared to our published version. In particular, we delve deeper into the headline statistics on international commercial arbitration (ICA) case filings recorded across Asian institutions, especially in Singapore, compared say to Harvey AI which produced the summary Tables below: the first for Asia-based arbitral institutions, and the second adding Asia-related ICA case numbers for major non-Asian institutions:

  • Introduction

Asia is a large and diverse region, with disparate systems of law and dispute settlement. These range from China’s socialist legal system with influences from across the world; the common law jurisdictions of India, Pakistan, Hong Kong, Singapore and Malaysia; and the civil law systems of Japan (with common law infusions), Korea, Thailand, Indonesia and others regionally. Each has its own history and features, reflecting local conditions.  In the space available, it is not possible to discuss all of these jurisdictions.[1]  This chapter looks mainly at international commercial arbitration (ICA) through major arbitral institutions particularly North and Southeast Asian Region, focusing on the three centres in the region which have had the most success in attracting arbitration case filings both regionally and internationally and in building international reputations: Singapore International Arbitration Centre (SIAC), Hong Kong International Centre (HKIAC) and China International Economic and Trade Arbitration Centre (CIETAC).  It briefly discusses other developments in some other Asian centres, as well as ad hoc arbitration (especially in India) and international mediation.

ICA (as well as domestic arbitration, in some states) has grown strongly in Asia since the 1990s – especially over the last 15-20 years. This confounds some commentators who argued arbitration would not flourish due to “Asian values” favouring harmony and consensual dispute resolution (DR).[2] Yet there has been limited growth in international commercial mediation (and indeed domestic mediation for business disputes) from private suppliers of mediation services. This is despite some emergent government and institutional support in some Asian countries for mediation in cross-border commercial disputes, and many signings – albeit still not many ratifications – of the 2018 Singapore Mediation Convention.[3]

The chapter examines the relationship between the growth of arbitration and the functionality of domestic courts and wider civil justice systems; enforceability problems across the region; and the role of government as well as the courts in supporting ICA and mediation.

Overall development of Asian arbitration

Governments in Asia have increasingly shown an interest in encouraging ICA. With the exception of North Korea, almost all Asian nations are parties to the 1958 New York Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards (NYC).[4] The enforcement regime for arbitral awards under the New York Convention offers substantial potential benefits over domestic court systems and the difficulties of enforcing foreign judgments.

To create a viable alternative DR forum for international commercial contracts, and to clarify the role of domestic courts in supervising arbitrations, many Asian nations also updated their arbitration statutes. Many adopted in some form, as a reputable international template, the United Nations Commission on International Commercial Arbitration (UNCITRAL) Model Law on ICA (ML).[5]  Other states may be influenced by ML concepts and other international developments. China (discussed below) provides a good example.

In addition, many Asian nations (except notably India, Thailand and Vietnam) have acceded to the framework 1965 Washington Convention, assisting enforcement of investor-state dispute settlement (ISDS) arbitration through the International Centre for the Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID).[6] ISDS is briefly mentioned as it enhances familiarity with international arbitration generally, albeit sometimes generating controversy.[7]  Most Asian nations (except Myanmar and Nepal) are also contracting parties to the Permanent Court of Arbitration, with Indonesia (2026) the most recent Asian nation to accede.[8]

There has also been substantial growth in the number of arbitral institutions across Asia offering ICA and/or quite often mediation services.  Some have attracted significant number of ICA filings, but these may not be widely known. For example, the Vietnam International Arbitration Centre (VIAC) has recorded a considerable increase in arbitrations filed, especially over the last three years.[9]  Yet the success of the numerous institutions around Asia in attracting ICA remains highly variable, with some very successful institutions (discussed below in more detail) and other institutions that have hardly attracted any international cases.

Overall, despite the lack of concrete region-wide statistics, it appears that there has been strong growth in ICA in the Asian region taken as a whole. Recent statistics published by the International Chamber of Commerce (ICC), for example, indicate substantial interest in ICA across Asia.  Of the 881 cases filed under the ICC Arbitration Rules in 2025, 13.9 percent were from East and South Asia and the Pacific while 10.6 percent were from the Middle East and Central Asia.[10] Another Western-headquartered arbitration institution with a significant caseload involving Asian parties is the International Centre for Dispute Resolution (ICDR), created as a specialist division of American Arbitration Association in 1996. For example, it recorded 848 international cases filed in 2023, when about 351 Asian parties used ICDR services (174 from China and 32 from India, the second-largest group).[11]

Statistics published by individual Asia-based institutions also show mostly an increase in cases, albeit with some variability and exceptions.[12] However, care is needed (and exemplified below) when analysing reported ICA statistics. First, some centres (notably CIETAC and VIAC) adopt a broader definition of “international” when counting cases, extending beyond “truly” international cases where parties come from different states (the main ML definition) to encompass foreign related or “quasi-international” cases between a local company and an affiliate of a foreign company. Secondly, some institutions may count cases “handled”, including not only those administered under their own Rules, but also those under others like the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules designed originally for ad hoc arbitration (so with the institution playing more limited roles), or even where the institution makes a default arbitrator appointment under background arbitration law (as with SIAC).

In addition to ad hoc arbitration, plus institutional arbitrations administered under ICC and ICDR Rules, three (more or less state-backed or supported) Asian institutions have been particularly successful, not just in the region but also for users outside Asia. According to the most recent well-regarded international arbitration survey by Queen Mary University of London with White & Case,[13]  Singapore, Beijing and Hong Kong were all ranked globally in the top five seats for ICA, along with London (first) and Paris (fifth). Their arbitration rules were similarly ranked highly: third was SIAC, second was HKIAC and sixth was CIETAC, after ICC (first), the London Court of International Arbitration (LCIA, fourth) and the UNCITRAL Rules (fifth). While all three are in the top five most preferred arbitration rules by region (with the ICC and Shenzhen Court of International Arbitration or SCIA, in the Asia-Pacific), only Singapore (along with LCIA) has the distinction of being in the top five in all regions.  HKIAC and SIAC have been particularly successful in attracting arbitrations from areas outside Hong Kong and Singapore.  SIAC became very attractive to Indian parties. HKIAC has a strong international clientele, but is especially attractive to parties to China-related arbitrations. CIETAC, unsurprisingly, has been popular with Chinese parties.


[1] See generally eg Julien Chaisse and Luke Nottage (eds), International Investment Treaties and Arbitration Across Asia (Brill 2018); Michael J Moser (ed), Arbitration in Asia (2nd edn, JurisNet 2022); Raymond Leung, Asia Mediation Handbook (Sweet & Maxwell 2015); Shahla Ali and others (eds), New Frontiers in Asia-Pacific International Arbitration and Dispute Resolution (Kluwer Law International 2021); Nobumichi Teramura, Luke Nottage and Bruno Jetin (eds), Corruption and Illegality in Asian Investment Arbitration (Springer 2024) (open access) <https://link.springer.com/book/10.1007/978-981-99-9303-1> accessed 27 July 2026. [could consider cutting down this footnote if short of space LRN well we have to cut hugely especially eg Parts 1 and 2 anyway]

[2] cf generally Michael Pryles and Veronica Taylor, ‘The Cultures of Dispute Resolution in Asia’ in Michael Pryles (ed), Dispute Resolution in Asia (Kluwer Law International 1997) 1.

[3] United Nations Convention on International Settlement Agreements Resulting from Mediation (adopted 20 December 2018, entered into force 12 September 2020) (Singapore Convention on Mediation). See generally Nadja Alexander, Shouyu Chong and Vakho Giorgadze, The Singapore Convention on Mediation: A Commentary (2nd edn, Kluwer Law International 2022).

[4] Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards (adopted 10 June 1958, entered into force 7 June 1959) 330 UNTS 3 (New York Convention); ratification status at <https://uncitral.un.org/en/texts/arbitration/conventions/foreign_arbitral_awards>.

[5] Adopters include Azerbaijan, Bangladesh, Bhutan, Brunei Darussalam, Cambodia, Hong Kong, Macao, India, Japan, Korea, Malaysia, Myanmar, the Philippines, Qatar, Singapore, Sri Lanka, Thailand and the UAE.  The ML has not been adopted in Afghanistan, China, Indonesia, Kazakhstan, Lao PDR, Nepal, Taiwan or Vietnam.  See UNCITRAL, UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration (1985), with amendments as adopted in 2006; adoption status at <https://uncitral.un.org/en/texts/arbitration/modellaw/commercial_arbitration/status>.

[6] Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes between States and Nationals of Other States (adopted 18 March 1965, entered into force 14 October 1966) 575 UNTS 159 (ICSID Convention); ratification status at <https://icsid.worldbank.org/about/member-states/database-of-member-states> accessed 27 July 2026.

[7] Teramura, Nottage and Jetin (n 1); Luke Nottage, ‘Evolving Antipodean, Asian and European Ambivalence Around ISDS Arbitration: A Compromise Way Forward?’ (2026) 34 Griffith Law Review (forthcoming).

[8] Permanent Court of Arbitration, ‘Contracting Parties’ <https://pca-cpa.org/en/about/introduction/contracting-parties/> accessed 7 July 2026.

[9] Vietnam International Arbitration Centre, ‘Statistics on Dispute Resolution Activities in 2025’ <https://viac.vn/en/statistics/statistics-on-dispute-resolution-activities-in-2025-s49.html> accessed 27 July 2026.  Although almost half of the 532 cases filed in 2025 were foreign-related, this may include foreign invested enterprises in Vietnam rather than foreign parties.

[10] International Chamber of Commerce, ‘ICC Dispute Resolution 2025’ <https://www.iccwbo.org> accessed 9 August 2026.

[11] See <https://www.faegredrinker.com/en/insights/publications/2024/9/icdr-jams-scc-and-hkiac-release-caseload-statistics-for-2023>  and <https://www.reedsmith.com/articles/icdrs-strategic-vision-for-asia/>, accessed 13 August 2026.

[12] Each institution has its own way of setting out statistics, particularly in relation to the question of what constitutes a foreign or international case.

[13] White & Case and Queen Mary University of London, ‘2025 International Arbitration Survey: The Path Forward: Realities and Opportunities in Arbitration’ (2025) <https://www.qmul.ac.uk/arbitration/media/arbitration/docs/White-Case-QMUL-2025-International-Arbitration-Survey-report.pdf> accessed 22 June 2026, charts 3, 4 and 5.

Singapore and SIAC

To bolster cross-border investment and trade, Singapore was quite quick within Asia to ratify the NYC, in 1986. After the ML was agreed in 1985, Singapore also adopted that as the template for its International Arbitration Act 1994. For domestic arbitrations, Singapore replaced its remaining arbitration statute based on English law with the ML-based Arbitration Act in 2001. It has not integrated the two statutes into one, as is the case in Hong Kong. Nor has Singapore (unlike Hong Kong) adopted the 2006 ML amendments – although a 2009 amendment to the International Arbitration Act does allow enforcement of (local and foreign-seated) arbitrators’ interim measures orders.

Singapore also still shows some deference to English case law in some respects, where the ML is unclear or has gaps. Notably, its courts maintain a complex multi-step approach to determine the law applicable to the arbitration agreement when the parties have not expressly agreed on this.[1]

Overall, partly because Singapore adopted the ML later than HK, case law was less internationalist in applying its international arbitration legislation. However, 2001 and 2002 the legislature promptly amended its Act following judgments addressing implied opting out of the ML regime from parties’ choice of Rules, which were unhelpful in promoting Singapore as a seat.[2] Singaporean judgments subsequently became arguably as internationalist as Hong Kong’s judgments. This pattern can be seen for example in substantial deference by Singaporean courts to the procedural decisions of arbitrators,[3] although they still intervene in egregious cases.[4]

The Singaporean government and judiciary promoted ADR from the 1980s primarily to address delays in civil litigation, focusing on mediation,[5] but it also encouraged establishment of SIAC in 1991. SIAC already then introduced its first set of standalone Arbitration Rules, with the most recent (7th) edition published in 2025 after extensive public consultation. However its caseload only grew slowly through to 2008, when it reached 99 cases filed, before jumping to 160 in 2009 and 198 in 2010:[6]

By 2019 there were 479 cases handled (87% international), including 25 cases (5% of [2] [3] [4] [5] the total) limited to making default appointments of arbitrators in otherwise ad hoc proceedings.[7] The latter arises through parties’ prior agreement to this restricted role for SIAC, eg by specifying it as the appointing authority but otherwise arbitrating under UNCITRAL Rules, or in purely ad hoc proceedings with no agreed Rules but with SIAC as default appointing authority under the 1994 Act. The 2019 Annual Report implies that from 2009, where the proportion of default appointments for ad hoc proceedings was 17.5% (28 out of 160 total cases handled), the proportion declined more or less consistently to 6.7% by 2018.

This decline continued from 2019 into the 2020s (excluding an anomaly in 2025), showing SIAC’s evolution into a full-service institutional arbitration provider and the broader global trend favouring institutional over ad hoc arbitration. Thus, in 2021 SIAC recorded handling 469 cases, with 5% being only default appointments.[8] Yet in 2025 SIAC handled 866 cases (89% international), but this included 149 default appointments (a remarkable 17% of the total) – so cases involving full administration by SIAC (under its Rules) comprised only 717 cases, both domestic and international.[9]

However, it seems that that 135 of the 149 default appointments were in “related cases”[10] (though counted separately), which likely explains this significant jump. Somewhat similarly, SIAC had declared a record 1080 cases for 2020, yet the numbers of all arbitrators appointed (almost all for cases under its own Rules) remained similar to 2019 – one commentator adds this suggested:[11] “a smaller number of arbitrations than appears on the face as SIAC allows arbitrations under associated contracts to be commenced in a single notice of arbitration (for the purpose of the case statistics these count as multiple cases)”.

Indeed, as mentioned above, the annual new cases handled by SIAC dropped down again to 469 in 2021 (similar to 2019), before resuming steady growth through to 866 cases in 2025 (although only 717 fully administered).

SIAC’s significant step up in cases filed over 2009-10 was likely assisted by a delayed impact from disputes arising from the 2007 Global Financial Crisis, since other international arbitration institutions (including HKIAC) also saw an increase around that time. But SIAC also benefited by the inauguration of Maxwell Chambers in 2010 (and greatly expanded in 2019, unveiled the day after the signing ceremony for the Singapore Mediation Convention). [1] The government contributed significantly to the refurbishment of this public property, with state-of-the-art hearing rooms and office space not only for smaller practitioners and SIAC but other arbitral organisations.

In addition, SIAC’s third edition Rules (2007) started shifting away from the UNCITRAL Rules core characterising the first (1991) and second (1997) editions.[2] This accelerated with the 2010 Rules (fourth edition), adding innovative Emergency Arbitrator and Expedited Arbitration procedures. Notably also from 2007, to encourage efficiency by arbitrators SIAC moved from the traditional LCIA (and still HKIAC) remuneration on an hourly rate, to fees based on dispute amount (as in the ICC).

The SIAC 2013 Rules (fifth edition) were also noteworthy by adopting a new structure for governance. It created the SIAC Court of Arbitration, modelled on the ICC Court and LCIA Court. The Court was to decide challenges to arbitrators and objections to SIAC’s prima facie jurisdiction, determine matters of arbitration policy, and oversee case administration and SIAC Secretariat work. The SIAC Board of Directors was refocused on business operations, marketing and development, and corporate governance. Dr Michael Pryles from Australia, appointed Chairman of the Board from 2009, became the founding President of the SIAC Court. That also comprised 16 leading arbitration practitioners from many jurisdictions,[3] mimicking the ICC Court’s multinational character to give SIAC credibility as a truly global institution. This was reinforced by appointing as President, from the USA, Gary Born from 2015 and Lucy Reed from 2021.


[1]See S Jayakumar, ‘Speech at the Grand Opening of Maxwell Chambers’ (Singapore, 21 January 2010) <https://www.nas.gov.sg/archivesonline/data/pdfdoc/20100806001.htm> accessed 27 July 2026 (mentioning PCA, ICC-ICA, WIPO AMC and ICSID committed as tenants); interview with Philip Jeyaretnam (Chairman, Maxwell Chambers), Asia Business Law Journal <https://law.asia/maxwell-chambers-arbitration-evolution/> accessed 27 July 2026 [Luke/Vivienne to add article title and date].

[2] See SIAC, ‘Administered Arbitration’ <https://siac.org.sg/administered-arbitration> and generally John Choong, Mark Mangan and Nicholas Lingard, A Guide to the SIAC Arbitration Rules (2nd edn, Oxford University Press 2018).

[3] Including Bahrain, Belgium, China, France, India, Japan, Singapore, UK and USA: Shaun Lee, ‘Changes at the SIAC: New Rules, New Structure, New Members’ (Singapore International Arbitration Blog, 2 April 2013) <https://singaporeinternationalarbitration.wordpress.com/2013/04/02/changes-at-the-siac-new-rules-new-structure-new-members/> accessed 27 July 2026.

Since the 2010 and 2013 SIAC Rules (from the 4th and 5th editions onward), draft awards are submitted to the Registrar (heading the Secretariat) who may suggest modifications as to the form, similarly to the ICC. Such developments helped SIAC to market itself also as a high-quality institution (with commensurate administration fees), to attract cases and bolster cross-border enforceability prospects. Singapore Courts provided assistance by upholding in 2010 an earlier arbitration agreement providing for ICC Rules arbitration administered by SIAC, indicating for example that the SIAC then Board could perform some of the ICC Court functions.[12]

The SIAC Rules 2016 (sixth edition) kept attracting attention through innovations such as a  procedure for early dismissal of claims manifestly without legal merit (adapted from ICSID Arbitration Rules), along with expanded provisions for multiple contracts, consolidation and joinder (reflecting the increasing complexity of arbitrations being filed – although such patterns are also found in HKIAC and other arbitral centres). The 2025 SIAC Rules expanded significantly in length, notably adding introducing ex parte emergency relief (protective preliminary orders) and a Streamlined Procedure for smaller claims than under the Expedited Procedure track).

SIAC also benefited from the growth of intra-Asian trade and investment, especially the rise of India, where it enjoyed a significant advantage over Hong Kong and China. The latter were only gazetted under Indian law for enforcement of their awards in 2012, whereas Singapore was in a first group of gazetted countries dating back to India’s Foreign Awards (Recognition and Enforcement) Act 1961.[13] Indian parties therefore began arbitrating extensively in Singapore, which marketed itself heavily in India – setting up two offices there from 2013.[14] However in recent years the proportion of Indian cases in SIAC has dropped (by numbers) relative to those involving China and Hong Kong.[15]

SIAC further introduced Investment Arbitration Rules in 2017. However, SIAC does not report any case applying them, despite having “administered investment disputes under standard SIAC Rules and … served as the appointing authority in investment disputes under the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules”.[16] This is not too unexpected as the usual way nowadays for investment arbitration rules to apply in ISDS is through being provided as an option for foreign investors under investment treaties, sometimes dating back decades; and those currently overwhelmingly list ICSID and/or UNCITRAL Rules. SIAC’s Rules however can be marketed more now that Singaporean courts have developed significant experience in dealing with ISDS cases.[17]

The Singapore Chamber of Maritime Arbitration (SCMA) was established in 2004 under SIAC management. However, especially after feedback that the maritime community preferred a non-administered, ad hoc-style model rather than the fully administered institutional model that SIAC was increasingly adopting, SCMA —reconstituted in May 2009 as an independent organisation. It adopts a “light touch” self-administered model, deliberately modeled on the London Maritime Arbitrators Association (LMAA) rather than on administered institutions like the ICC or SIAC.

It has seen some significant growth, from over 100 cases during 2009-11 (combined with SIAC[18]), 43 just in SCMA in 2020, and 95 in 2024. Over 50% of parties involved in SCMA disputes are not Singapore-based. Singapore’s overall share of global maritime arbitration has grown from approximately 5% of London’s volume in 2022 to 9% in 2024. The recent surge has been attributed in part to the global trade war, which has generated increased shipping and trade disputes in the Asia-Pacific region.[19]


[1] Anupam Mittal v Westbridge Ventures II Investment Holdings [2023] SGCA 1. Along that line, see also Singapore International Dispute Resolution Academy (SIDRA), Review of the Singapore International Arbitration Act (November 2024) <https://sidra.smu.edu.sg/sites/sidra.smu.edu.sg/files/2025-03/Review%20of%20the%20Singapore%20International%20Arbitration%20Act%20(2024)_final.pdf> accessed 27 July 2026.

[2] Mohan Pillay, ‘The Singapore Arbitration Regime and the UNCITRAL Model Law’ (2004) 20(4) Arbitration International 355. By contrast, a revision to Australia’s International Arbitration Act came only in 2010, by preventing opting out altogether (s 21) to counteract similarly unhelpful case law.

[3] Luke Nottage, ‘Deference from National Courts to Tribunals on Issues of Procedure at the Post-Award Stage’ in Franco Ferrari and Friedrich Rosenfeld (eds), Deference in International Commercial Arbitration: The Shared System of Control in International Commercial Arbitration (Kluwer Law International 2023).

[4] Eg BZV v BZW [2022] SGCA 1 (setting aside a SIAC award found ‘manifestly incoherent’) and DJO v DJP[2024] SGHC(I) 24, upheld in DJP v DJO [2025] SGCA(I) 2(setting aside upheld on appeal, where a SIAC award was tainted by the tribunal – including former Chief Justice of India Dipak Misra – self-plagiarising from an award rendered in India arising from the same project).

[5] Eugene Tan, ‘Harmony as Ideology, Culture, and Control: Alternative Dispute Resolution in Singapore’ (2007) 9(1) Australian Journal of Asian Law 120.

[6] SIAC, ‘CEO Annual Report 2010’ 3 (the first available via <https://siac.org.sg/annual-reports> accessed 27 July 2026). This and other early Annual Reports do not specify the proportions of international cases, but this may have been lower than the proportions that later started being annually reported (over 85%).

[7] SIAC, ‘Annual Report 2019’ 14–15 <https://siac.org.sg/wp-content/uploads/2022/06/SIAC-AR_FA-Final-Online-30-June-2020.pdf>.

[8] SIAC, ‘Annual Report 2021’ 17 <https://siac.org.sg/wp-content/uploads/2022/06/SIAC-AR2021-FinalFA.pdf>.

[9] SIAC, ‘Annual Report 2025’ 26–27 <https://siac.org.sg/wp-content/uploads/2025/09/SIAC-Annual-Report-2025.pdf>. The Annual Report does not break down the proportion of international cases for this subset of 717 cases; it may be more or less than the 89% recorded for the total 866 cases.

[10] Herbert Smith Freehills Kramer, ‘SIAC Annual Report 2025: Key Statistics, Trends and Takeaways for International Arbitration’ (2026) <https://www.hsfkramer.com/notes/arbitration/2026-5/siac-annual-report-2025-key-statistics-trends-takeaways-for-international-arbitration> accessed 27 July 2026.

[11] Amanda Lees, ‘SIAC Statistics: Looking Behind the Large Increase in SIAC Caseload’ (Mallesons Pulse, 29 April 2021) <https://pulse.mallesons.com/international-arbitration/siac-statistics-looking-behind-the-large-increase-in-siac-caseload> accessed 27 July 2026 – adding as other possible explanations for this anomalous spike in 2020: ‘a large number of cases in which the tribunal is yet to be appointed due to delay by the parties in paying their deposits … and arbitrations being commenced for limitation or settlement purposes only and then stayed’.

[12] Eg Insigma Technology Co Ltd v Alstom Technology Ltd [2009] SGCA 24, [2009] 3 SLR(R) 936; see also Richard Hill, ‘Hybrid ICC/SIAC Arbitration Clause Upheld in Singapore’ (Kluwer Arbitration Blog, 10 June 2009) <https://legalblogs.wolterskluwer.com/arbitration-blog/hybrid-iccsiac-arbitration-clause-upheld-in-singapore/> accessed 27 July 2026.

[13] Michelle Bradfield and Daniel Harrison, ‘India to Recognise and Enforce Arbitral Awards from China’ (Lexology, 1 October 2012) https://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=f817c2a2-6f53-4c62-afb0-22545a790fc8 accessed 27 July 202; Government of India, Ministry of Law and Justice, Notification SO 2252(E), Gazette of India, Extraordinary, pt II, s 3(ii) (23 September 2008); Ritin Rai, ‘India’ in International Chamber of Commerce, ICC Guide to National Procedures for Recognition and Enforcement of Awards under the New York Convention (2019) https://jusmundi.com/en/document/publication/en-india-9 accessed 27 July 2026.

[14] By 2013 (when 21% of SIAC’s caseload was still maritime/shipping), for 259 cases handled there were 85 Indian parties. SIAC, ‘Annual Report 2013’ 7 <https://siac.org.sg/wp-content/uploads/2022/06/SIAC_Annual_Report_2013-1.pdf>.

[15] ibid; Herbert Smith Freehills Kramer (op cit).

[16] Aceris Law, ‘Singapore International Arbitration Centre FAQ’ 3 <https://www.acerislaw.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/03/Singapore-International-Arbitration-Centre-FAQ.pdf>.

[17] See eg the Sanum v Laos dispute, discussed in Romesh Weeramantry and Uma Sharma, ‘Corruption and Investment Arbitration in the Lao People’s Democratic Republic: Corruptio Incognito’ in Teramura, Nottage and Jetin (n 1) 311 <https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007/978-981-99-9303-1_12>.

[18] Maritime/shipping has consistently been a major SIAC dispute category and still represented 10% of its 2025 caseload (85 cases): SIAC, ‘Annual Report 2025’ (op cit) 32.

[19] Sarah Wong, “Global Trade Law Propels Singapore’s Surge as Maritime Arbitration Hub”  Asian Legal Business (25 November 2025) <https://www.legalbusinessonline.com/features/print-issue-global-trade-war-propels-singapore%E2%80%99s-surge-maritime-arbitration-hub> accessed 14 August 2026.


International Arbitration in Asia – events on 23 August 2026

My hybrid presentations at Kwansei Gakuin University (Kwangaku Kaikan) SUNDAY 23 AUGUST, hosted by its Research Center for International Negotiation, Dispute Resolution and Policy (initially the day before the Japanese-US Law conference on ESG investing there but RESCHEDULED DUE TO TYPHOON) are as follows: 

Time:  2026, August 23rd 15:00 – 18:00 pm  (Online & Face-to-Face Hybrid)

Zoom:   Meeting ID: 880 9514 1359    Passcode: 1196801

Venue: Kwanseigakuin University Kangaku-Kaikan (Tsubasa-no-Ma)

A. Speech, 15:00~16:10: “Commercial Mediation, Arbitration and ISDS in Common Law versus Civil Law Asia: Two Steps Forward, One Step Back”
(Abstract) As a first regional trend, commercially-supplied mediation services have become popular only in some common law jurisdictions in Asia (Singapore and Hong Kong, influenced by England and Australia). They are not widely practiced yet in Malaysia or even India (despite delays in civil litigation), nor in civil law jurisdictions in Asia (where often a longer tradition of Court-annexed mediation). This backdrop creates problems for ratifications of the Singapore Mediation Convention. Secondly, international commercial arbitration is expanding regionally but most notably in Singapore and (less?) Hong Kong. Partly this is due to delays and especially costs in arbitration. Yet the practice of Arb-Med is diminishing. Thirdly, treaty-based Investor-State Dispute Settlement arbitration remains controversial in some parts of the Asia-Pacific region. Yet there is limited experimentation eg for Med-Arb (mandatory mediation before ISDS arbitration) or an EU-style investment court compromise. Overall, international commercial dispute resolution continues to grow but with significant intra-regional variations and other challenges. Powerpoints are here:

    B. Workshop: International Commercial Arbitration/Mediation Moot 16:15~18:00

    1.Arbitration Moot & How to study 16:1517:15

    (1) Presiding Arbitrator: Prof. Luke Nottage

    32nd Vis-Moot Procedural Problem, 1 Session (10 min/each+ Feedback10 Min.)

    (2) How to study

    By Prof. Susan-Gale Wintermuth (China-EU School of Law)

    2.Introduction & Mediation Moot 17:1518:00

      (1) Introduction: Prof. Takamori

    (2) Mock Mediation

    See also https://japaneselaw.sydney.edu.au/2024/02/the-vis-moot-in-japan-tips-and-tricks-for-participants/

    ANJeL-in-Europe events 2-9 November 2026

    Professor Luke Nottage will give a series of lectures, partly coordinated kindly by ANJeL-in-Europe convenor Prof Giorgio Colombo (Ca’ Foscari, University of Venice) as follows, before supporting Team Australia students at the INC negotiation and arbitration moot competition in Tokyo over 12-17 November:

    1. 2 November, University of Frankfurt (hosted by Prof Moritz Baelz): “The Impact of EU Traceability Regulations for Asia’s EV Battery Manufacturers, Australia’s Critical Raw Materials Suppliers, Global Trade and Dispute Resolution”. This is based on a forthcoming book for Hart with Prof Jeanne Huang, and our article with this Abstract:
      • “The value chains for critical raw materials (CRM) used in electric vehicle (EV) batteries often involve mining in the Global South, Australia and Canada, production in Asia, and consumption in the Global North. Starting in 2027, EU law will require a ‘digital product passport’ (DPP) for market entry. These passports will provide EU consumers, investors, regulators and others with products and sustainability data throughout the entire value chain. The EU DPP aims to improve ESG (Environmental, Social and Governance) compliance by ensuring high transparency and verifiable data from miners, producers and recyclers. However, legal, geopolitical, commercial and technological factors suggest that major economies in the up-and mid-stream of the value chains, such as Australia, China and Japan, may maintain or develop their own traceability laws, which might only partially overlap with the EU’s system. These laws could potentially be linked through mutual recognition agreements with the EU. Our paper explores how such a system could function, with varying degrees of decentralisation, inspired partly by private international law mechanisms that have evolved to handle cross-border traceability of documents. Examples include systems for recognising marriage and other personal or commercial certificates, arbitral awards and foreign judgments.”
    2. 4 November, University of Turino (hosted by Prof Michele Graziadei): “Consumer Law Redress and Administration, Product Safety Regulation and Contracts in Japan and Australia” (based on article with Prof Souichirou Kozuka and published also in Italian, updated including by reference my National Report on Australia with Prof Jeannie Paterson for the September 2026 Berlin IACL Congress session / book on “Contractual Justice”):
      • “This paper explores developments in consumer law and practice in Japan, as an important area that has not seen much comparative scholarship in Western languages despite significant developments over the last 10-20 years. The paper connects developments to broader debates about the nature of contemporary Japanese law and society, and mainly compares Australia although other jurisdictions are also discussed. The comparative analysis first explains the persistent problems for consumer redress. It then focuses on issues and reforms in consumer affairs administration, including the functions of reforming and enforcing consumer laws, the relationship with competition law concepts and regulators, and the relationship between consumer affairs regulators and other government agencies or stakeholders. The paper then examines developments in consumer product safety law and contracts, including new challenges from e-commerce and digital technologies, before drawing some conclusions.”
    3. 6 November, University of Venice (hosted by Prof Colombo): “The Identity of Japanese Law: A Journey with History, Orientalism and Technicalities”, based on our manuscript for Luca Siliquini Cinelli et al (eds) Research Handbook on the Philosophical Foundations of Comparative Law:
      • “Japanese law is one of the favourite playgrounds for comparative lawyers. This is partly due to historical reasons: the Japanese legal system is a product of the joint influence of Chinese imperial law (starting from the 7th century), continental European law (in the second half of the 19th century), and US law (after WWII). All these influences have been filtered by the local legal culture, and the resulting product is of unmistakable charm for any comparative law expert. However, the identity of Japanese law is still heatedly debated. Generations of scholars, both Japanese and foreign, have tried to demonstrate that Japanese law is completely unique or very similar to other European civil law systems; that the influence of the American system on Japan is of utmost importance or almost negligible; that laws are scrupulously observed or light-heartedly disregarded in favour of local customs and traditions. So what isthe identity of Japanese law? Building on the vast corpus of available comparative research, the authors intend to deal with the most common representations of the Japanese legal system to critically assess their merits and shortcomings.”
    4. 9 November, University of Milan (Statale) (hosted by Prof Diana Urania Galetta) “The Interface of Inquests with Consumer Law and Policy: The Takata Airbag Debacle in Australia and Beyond“, based on my UNSWLJ 2026 article, with this Abstract:
      • “Unsafe Takata airbags remain in circulation, in Australia and worldwide, despite almost two decades of recalls and recent initiatives to improve consumer product safety regulation generally (Parts 1-3). The NSW coronial Inquest over 2019-2021 into Australia’s first known fatality in 2017 uncovered how Honda Australia and regulators were partly asleep at the wheel regarding voluntary recalls (Part 4). The fatality triggered a belated compulsory recall and legislative reform to allow the Transport Department such powers, both introduced in 2018, and by the end of the Inquest the Department was taking a clear lead role in vehicle recalls. The Inquest findings and recommendations for avoiding future harms from Takata airbag and other recalls, only released in November 2021, flew largely under the radar in the media but influenced some regulatory practices and could have had an impact on private litigation (Part 5). Such inquests and analogues overseas, little discussed in the legal literature, deserve wider scrutiny (Part 6). They can help identify serious product related risks and responses, assisting compensation claims and regulatory learning, while avoiding future harms and providing an extra resource for consumer product safety law reforms.”

    Inquests and Consumer Product Safety: The Takata Airbag Recall Inquest

    [Update: Presentation for Nihon University’s Institute of Comparative Law on 29 July 2026 from 4.20pm (Room 146 Auditorium).]

    Below is the abstract of my forthcoming paper, based partly on participant observation of an inquest proceeding over 2019-21 in Sydney after the 2017 death of a Honda driver from an exploding Takata airbag that had not yet been replaced in a huge global recall. It will be be published in 49(3) UNSWLJ pp679–711 in October 2026. A pre-publication, author-produced version of the article, subject to editorial revision, is already freely available via SSRN. A powerpoint summary is here:

    As noted in the Introduction, problems persist and for example hearings occurred in late 2025 in Singapore for an inquest into the 2022 death of another Honda driver there from a Takata airbag, with the (with that coroner’s findings summarised by media in January 2026 – but with that report unfortunately not made public, unlike in Australia).

    ‘The Interface of Inquests with Consumer Law and Policy: The Takata Airbag Debacle in Australia and Beyond’#

    Luke Nottage

    1. Introduction
    2. Consumer Product Safety Re-regulation in Australia
    3. The Takata Airbag Debacle
    4. The Coronial Inquest (2019-2021)
    5. The Aftermath of the Inquest
    6. Other Consumer Product-related Inquests and Analogues Abroad
    7. Conclusions

    Abstract: Unsafe Takata airbags remain in circulation, in Australia and worldwide, despite almost two decades of recalls and recent initiatives to improve consumer product safety regulation generally (Parts 1-3). The NSW coronial Inquest over 2019-2021 into Australia’s first known fatality in 2017 uncovered how Honda Australia and regulators were partly asleep at the wheel regarding voluntary recalls (Part 4). The fatality triggered a belated compulsory recall and legislative reform to allow the Transport Department such powers, both introduced in 2018, and by the end of the Inquest the Department was taking a clear lead role in vehicle recalls. The Inquest findings and recommendations for avoiding future harms from Takata airbag and other recalls, only released in November 2021, flew largely under the radar in the media but influenced some regulatory practices and could have had an impact on private litigation (Part 5). Such inquests and analogues overseas, little discussed in the legal literature, deserve wider scrutiny (Part 6). They can help identify serious product related risks and responses, assisting compensation claims and regulatory learning, while avoiding future harms and providing an extra resource for consumer product safety law reforms.


    # I thank Sean Hasegawa for research and editorial assistance.  I am also grateful for helpful feedback and/or information from Simon Bronitt, Philip Dwyer, Sarouche Razi, Damian Scattini, Cameron Stewart and two anonymous reviewers. Any misconceptions and errors remain my sole responsibility.

    Asian International Investment Agreements (IIAs) and Arbitration

    Two of my recent articles in this area are now freely available in Open Access. The first below develops with Nobumichi Teramura an empirical argument comparing corruption-related provisions in IIAs across Asian states, including Japan as a very interesting case, building on our co-edited 2024 book. The other looks at wider regional developments around dispute resolution mechanisms in such agreements, including more focus on Australia. Both states have an opportunity to show regional and indeed global leadership for such mechanisms.

    1. Nobumichi Teramura, Luke Nottage, Corruption-related provisions in East and South Asian investment agreements: an empirical analysis, Journal of International Economic Law, 2025; jgaf013, https://doi.org/10.1093/jiel/jgaf013

    This article analyses two types of provisions relevant to corruption in Asian international investment agreements (IIAs): clauses requiring (host) states to enforce anti-corruption laws and clauses that protect foreign investments made in accordance with host state laws. It tests whether IIA drafters act rationally regarding such clauses, or instead show status quo or other biases. This is complex first because rational strategies should depend on whether the state is a net exporter of foreign direct investment (FDI) or a net importer, but we explain how determining this status may be difficult. Secondly, rational strategies should depend on the relative extent of corruption in each state and, somewhat relatedly, the extent of inbound FDI claims. Despite such complexities and some instances of more ‘bounded’ rationality, overall states seem to be drafting both types of clauses rationally—even, and indeed especially, the net-FDI-importing states that tend to be transitioning economies. Adding to that empirical result from a more normative perspective, the article helps identify factors that could or should be considered by future IIA drafters, international bodies, or others tracking the trajectories of IIAs and corruption in Asia and beyond.

    2. Luke Nottage, Australia’s Ambivalence Again Around Investor-State Arbitration: Comparisons with Europe and Implications for Asia, ICSID Review – Foreign Investment Law Journal, Volume 39, Issue 2, Spring 2024, Pages 320–346, https://doi.org/10.1093/icsidreview/siae029

    In late 2022 Australia’s new Labor government declared that it would no longer agree to investor-State dispute settlement (ISDS) in future international investment agreements (IIAs). Section I reviews its previous anti-ISDS stance (governing with the Greens over 2011 to 2013) inspired by more articulated policy rationales but also the first claim against Australia, over tobacco plain packaging legislation. Then followed the centre-right coalition government’s return to including ISDS on a case-by-case assessment (2014–21) drawing partly on different arguments and evidence. Section II suggests that a new factor behind the latest policy shift comprises a second set of significant ISDS arbitration claims against Australia, from the Singaporean subsidiary of an Australian mining magnate and right-wing political leader. Section III draws parallels with the European Union (EU), whose developed economy member States reacted to inbound ISDS claims by replacing traditional ISDS from 2015 with an ‘investment court’ hybrid process, then influencing multilateral ISDS reform negotiations. Intra-EU ISDS claims are also being precluded by the Court of Justice of the EU, but in the context of European law and institutions providing an alternative pathway for European investors to hold other member States to account. Section IV considers the implications of Australia’s anti-ISDS stance for ongoing and potential IIA (re)negotiations with the EU and Asian States, including the feasibility of moving towards an EU-style investment court approach in Asia-Pacific IIAs. Section V concludes by linking these developments to ongoing debates about reforms to ISDS—locally, regionally and globally—as well as about incomplete investment IIAs.

    “The Promises and Pitfalls of International Commercial Arbitration”

    [This the abstract for my judicial training lecture organised by the Legal Training and Research Institute, kindly invited by the Supreme Court of Japan, delivered on 5 March 2025 at the Tokyo Facilities for Arbitration Hearings. Powerpoints are available in English and translated into Japanese. An edited, updated and footnoted version of the transcript is forthcoming in the Japan Commercial Arbitration Journal (2025).]

    Survey and other evidence typically identify many advantages of international commercial arbitration (ICA) over cross-border litigation. This explains why ICA is overwhelmingly the most preferred dispute resolution mechanism included in international commercial contracts (and even investment treaties). Yet ICA faces growing problems.

    Enforceability of arbitration agreements and awards is challenged by new Hague Conventions for enforcement of judgments, and by the 2018 Singapore Convention for enforcing mediated settlements, although these instruments still have few ratifications. Neutrality and related expertise of arbitrators encounter rising challenges to arbitrators and the emergence of international commercial courts, notably in Singapore. Confidentiality in arbitration is not uniform and anyway can increase unpredictability, as well as making it harder for users to assess if arbitrators and lawyers provide good value for their services. Limited discovery of documentary evidence and other flexibility in arbitration procedures is offset by the proliferation and hardening of “soft law” instruments and standardised practices. The lack of appeal for error of law promises finality in awards but arbitration overall is not much quicker, cheaper or more amicable than litigation of commercial disputes.

    This lecture elaborates such promises and pitfalls of ICA nowadays. It considers what could be done to improve the environment for ICA generally, enhancing traditional advantages while reducing costs and delays, in the context of countries like Australia and Japan that have struggled to attract ICA cases.

    Related reading:

    Guest Blog – Corruption and Investment Arbitration in Asia: New Frontiers

    Written by: Corinna Chen (CAPLUS research assistant, 2024)

    On 1 August 2024, the University of Sydney Law School hosted an insightful seminar jointly presented by its Centre for Asian and Pacific Law (CAPLUS) and the Australian Network for Japanese Law (ANJeL). The event featured the local re-launch of a new book titled Corruption and Illegality in Asian Investment Arbitration (Teramura, Nottage and Jetin eds, published in Open Access in Springer’s Asia in Transition series in April 2024) as well as discussions on the latest research in the field.

    Professor Simon Bronitt, immediate past Dean of Sydney Law School with personal research interests in criminal law and Indonesia, opened the session with a brief welcome and address. Assistant Professor Nobumichi Teramura from Universiti Brunei Darussalam – lead co-editor of the new book – then presented an overview of the book’s aims, research questions and key findings (also summarised in a recent piece here and in the East Asia Forum). Professor Luke Nottage from the University of Sydney, also co-editor, complemented this by sharing empirical results from his recent research on corruption-related provisions in international investment agreements (IIAs).

    Various other contributing authors also spoke on their areas of focus within the book. These included Professor Vivienne Bath from the University of Sydney discussing China and the Hong Kong SAR, Professor Simon Butt from the University of Sydney and Antony Crockett from Herbert Smith Freehills (Hong Kong) discussing Indonesia, as well as additional commentary from Dr Amokura Kawharu, President of the New Zealand Law Commission. The seminar concluded with closing remarks from the Honourable Wayne Martin AC KC, former Chief Justice of Western Australia, who officiated the book re-launch.

    * * *

    Despite avid efforts to combat corruption through international treaties and domestic legislation, corruption and illegality in foreign direct investment (FDI) remains prevalent across many Asian countries. Associate Professor Teramura highlighted this as the key motivation behind the project, emphasising the book’s focus on illustrating ‘Asian’ perspectives towards corruption in investment arbitration and exploring the potential for significant Asian states to become ‘rule makers’ rather than ‘rule takers’ in this field (PDF of Powerpoints here). 

    The research examines the practical impacts of corruption on FDI and local economies in Asia, as well as how illegality in foreign investment projects and disputes have been dealt with across various Asian jurisdictions such as China, Hong Kong, India, Japan, Lao Republic, the Philippines, the Republic of Korea and Thailand. Associate Professor Teramura noted that while some ‘Asian approaches’ are emerging, they are still far from establishing a uniform stance across the region.

    The book concludes by proposing a roadmap for developing a more cohesive Asian approach. This includes establishing a regional forum for discussing FDI-related corruption, developing unified rules for handling corruption in investment arbitration, and considering the creation of an independent institution or permanent court to address allegations of corruption in Asian investment disputes.

    Following this, Professor Luke Nottage presented compelling insights from his recent paper co-authored with Associate Professor Teramura: “Corruption-related Provisions in East and South Asian Investment Agreements: An Empirical Analysis” (PDF of Powerpoints here). The study revealed a nuanced and often rational approach by Asian countries in negotiating bilateral investment treaties, particularly in their treatment of anti-corruption provisions and legality clauses. 

    The research found that net FDI-exporting countries like Japan tend to prefer anti-corruption provisions (59%) over direct legality clauses (16%) in their IIAs, aligning with the aim to reduce corruption in investment destinations and protect their outbound investors. Conversely, net FDI-importing countries such as China are more likely to include legality clauses (95%) and almost no anti-corruption provisions, as the former can be invoked to protect their government and domestic taxpayers from inbound ISDS claims. Overall, the empirical analysis found largely rational treaty drafting practices around these two types of provisions across most countries, based on their FDI status. 

    However, Professor Nottage noted some curious exceptions to this rationality, particularly in the case of Singapore. Despite being virtually corruption free, Singapore rarely includes anti-corruption provisions in its IIAs (only 4%) but retains many legality clauses (61%). This apparent irrationality might be related to Singapore’s outbound FDI often coming from government-linked companies. Such instances of “bounded rationality” or status quo bias provide valuable insights for policymakers and IIA drafters, emphasising the need to consider these complex dynamics when addressing corruption and illegality in international investment frameworks. He concluded with the observation that although most countries appear to be acting rationally with regard to their national interests, such approaches may not be entirely conducive towards addressing the overall prevalence of corruption in the Asian region. 

    Professor Vivienne Bath then presented insights on China and Hong Kong, based on her chapter with former student Dr Tianqi Gu. In particular, she highlighted several inconsistencies in China’s stance towards eliminating corruption. While China has increasingly sought to tackle these issues through extensive regulations, anti-corruption campaigns and signing the UNCAC, there is a notable lack of transparency with investigations and details of cases, both domestically and in investor-state dispute settlement proceedings. Official Chinese court databases feature very few corruption cases relating to foreign investors or FDIs. Professor Bath also pointed out the absence of legislation addressing corruption by companies and officials outside China, raising this as an important area for future development. 

    Antony Crockett and Professor Simon Butt spoke on Indonesia, which is infamous for having high levels of corruption across its numerous levels of government. The pervasiveness of corruption in the Indonesian government was illustrated by reference to the three high-profile cases of Churchill / Planet Mining, Al Warraq and Rafat. They noted that judicial corruption dramatically increases the attractiveness of international commercial arbitration, as commercial parties lack confidence in the judiciary and therefore refuse to settle disputes locally. An in-depth analysis of corruption in Indonesian courts can be found in Professor Butt’s recent book, Judicial Dysfunction in Indonesia. This details 30 trials involving allegations of corruption against judges from the supreme court, constitutional court, administrative court, and most disconcertingly, the anti-corruption court itself.

    Finally, Dr Amokura Kawharu, who wrote the foreword to the book, briefly discussed the perspective of New Zealand, currently ranked the third least corrupt country in the world. Despite this, New Zealand only ratified the UNCAC and enacted anti-corruption legislation in 2015. This, according to Dr Kawharu, might be explained by the difficulty policymakers face in competing for space on the legislative agenda, an issue compounded by the country’s short 3-year parliamentary terms.

    The Hon Wayne Martin AC KC concluded the evening’s discussions with his perspective on the importance of continued efforts to tackle corruption and illegality, which strike at the heart of the rule of law. He added some caution towards the idea of establishing a permanent international court, citing practical challenges such as the inability to attract strong candidates for the bench as well as the customary process of state appointments giving rise to further risks of nepotism.

    Zeph v Australia ISDS Arbitration Claims under AANZFTA

    [Some of the background below is included in my posting on the Kluwer Arbitration Blog on 15 September 2024 entitled “Aggravating Australia’s Arbitration Ambivalence: Zeph’s ISDS Claims“. I conclude:

    “… Overall, the Zeph claims against Australia, as well as parliamentary inquiries into ratification of IIAs like AANZFTA’s Second Protocol, are therefore likely to aggravate rather than assuage concerns in Australia over ISDS rekindled by the Labor Government’s new policy. This is despite tribunal rulings like those mentioned at the beginning [of the Blog posting, on interim measures], and considerable transparency in these multiple forums. Governments and stakeholders therefore need to work harder to promote productive debate and seek workable ways forward. An EU-style investment court or key features can be a useful discussion point for Australia and its counterparties to IIAs.”

    ***

    The opportunity for nuanced public debate about Australia’s Labor Government’s late 2022 reversion to eschewing ISDS, and my proposed compromise of an EU-style investment court alternative process or key features thereof (such as a standing panel of arbitrators or an appellate review mechanism), is complicated politically by a succession of ad hoc arbitration claims brought by Singapore-incorporated Zeph. Controlled by Clive Palmer and his subsidiaries based in Australia, Zeph has filed several claims since 2023 under the 2021 UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules, pursuant to the investment chapter of the original AANZFTA (signed in 2009) rather than the Second Protocol agreed in 2022 and expected to be ratified by Australia from mid-2024 (after the positive recommendation from JSCOT’s inquiry in which I gave evidence). Those objecting to retaining ISDS in the Protocol, albeit subject to a Work Program where the states party agreed to review whether ISDS should be retained, highlighted these Zeph claims. However, the JSCOT Report did not specifically mention the claimant, and its links to Australian mining magnate and former right-wing politician Clive Palmer.

    The first Zeph v Australia arbitration claim (commenced on 29 March 2023) impugns Western Australia legislation enacted in 2020 (unsuccessfully challenged under Australian constitutional law) interfering with rights awarded to his subsidiary Mineralogy in 2002 regarding an iron ore project, as confirmed by two commercial arbitration awards. By preventing also access to judicial and administrative review, the claim appears strong on the merits, as elaborated in a publically available Notice of Dispute of 14 October 2020 (albeit under the Singapore-Australia FTA) evoking breach of fair and equitable treatment, non-discrimination and other protections. However, the jurisdictional objections are significant. Was Zeph incorporated in Singapore (seemingly in 2019) when the dispute was “reasonably foreseeable”, so the tribunal loses jurisdiction under customary international law due to abuse of rights, under the test applied and found to be made out in Philip Morris Asia v Australia? Can Australia further invoke the ‘denial of benefits’ Article 11 in AANZFTA’s Investment Chapter 11, as Zeph is controlled by an Australian and arguably has “no substantive business operations” in Singapore?

    Accordingly, interesting legal and factual arguments are expected in hearings scheduled for the week of 16 September 2024 (under Procedural Order No 1), for the arbitration with the seat decided by the tribunal to be Geneva (contrary to Australia’s preference for London as seat). These hearings may take place at the seat in Geneva. However, as the agreed repository for documentation in this first Zeph case is the Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA) in The Hague, parties and the tribunal may instead decide to request use of the PCA’s well-appointed hearing rooms.

    Procedural Order No 3 (issued 19 January 2024), setting out transparency in most aspects for this first arbitration, interprets AANZFTA Chapter 11 Article 26.3 to make public such hearings and their transcripts (unless a party seeks and justifies confidentiality around certain information). Paragraph 15.iii of the Order adds that the parties’ “main written submissions shall be published on the PCA website at the end of the hearing to which they relate, subject to any prior redactions” of confidential information).

    Procedural Order No 2 largely rejected various interim measures applications by Zeph, including curiously that the JSCOT chair stop making public statements impugning ISDS generally. But some of these applications might be revived (if for example Western Australia invokes indemnities against Palmer and his interests, pursuant to its 2020 state legislation).

    Secondly, the Zeph v Australia (II) arbitration impugns measures taken by the Queensland state government relating to a minerals exploration project of Palmer’s subsidiary Waratah Coal. The Attorney-General’s Department revealed to federal Parliament in mid-2023 that Zeph had initiated a second ISDS claim, reportedly by notice of dispute under AANZFTA on 21 February 2023 followed by a formal notice of arbitration on 29 May 2023, seeking around A$41 billion in compensation. The agreed repository for this arbitration is again the PCA in The Hague.

    A decision of 26 September 2023, from the agreed Appointing Authority (PCA Secretary-General Dr Marcin Czepkelak) adds that the Notice of Arbitration includes alleged breaches of AANZFTA investment Chapter 11’s articles 6 and 9 (FET and expropriation) concerning the Queensland state government’s “decision to grant an environmental offset to a direct competitor of the Claimant over land in which the Claimant’s subsidiary had certain coal exploration permits”.

    The Appointing Authority’s decision rejected Australia’s challenge to Zeph’s nomination of Geneva-based Charles Poncet as arbitrator, based on old proceedings involving in him in Italian courts. Other public sources had indicated that Australia nominated Prof Don McCrae (also for the first Zeph case, and earlier the Philip Morris Asia v Australia case) and that the presiding arbitrator is Laurent Levy (who works in the same Geneva law firm as Prof Kaufmann-Kohler, who is presiding arbitrator in the first Zeph case).

    In late July 2024 three Procedural Orders from the Zeph II tribunal were also made available via the Zeph II arbitration’s PCA webpage. The first (dated 25 October 2023) sets the first hearing on preliminary objections as the week of 29 September 2024. Curiously, paragraph 10.5 observes that “In accordance with Article 25(4) of the UNCITRAL Rules, hearings shall be held in camera unless the Parties agree otherwise”.

    By contrast, Procedural Order No 3 (25 June 2024) paragraph 2.3 adopts the identical reasoning of the first Zeph arbitration tribunal in the latter’s Procedural Order No 3 on Transparency: AANZFTA’s “Article 26(3) stipulates that information submitted to the Tribunal or to either Party shall be protected from disclosure to the public if specifically designated as confidential. A contrario this implies that, absent such a specific confidentiality designation, the information in the record may be disclosed to the public.” Consistently, later in the Zeph II tribunal’s Procedural Order No 3, paragraph 2.9 notes that the parties agreed to apply certain elements of the first Zeph arbitration tribunal including that: “Hearings (other than procedural conferences) shall be open to the public. … Transcripts of the hearings shall be made public, subject to the redaction of protected information. Sound and/or video recordings should not be made public.” Again, it will be interesting therefore to see from the hearings scheduled for the week of 29 September 2025 (in person or perhaps livestreamed, and via subsequent transcripts and submissions) what jurisdictional objections are raised by Australia, presumably very similar to those being raised in the first Zeph arbitration hearings (scheduled for a year earlier).

    Paragraphs 1.3 and 1.4 further note in February 2024 the first Zeph arbitration tribunal had accepted Australia’s proposal to share information with the Zeph II arbitration tribunal, and that in March 2024 the parties agreed to adopt the first Zeph arbitration tribunal’s Procedural Order No 3 concerning procedures to protect any confidential information. Thus, despite there being only Prof Don McRae on both tribunals, there has been some alignment achieved and related procedural efficiencies achieved in the two parallel arbitrations. However, it seems regrettably inefficient for the same parties to hold hearings on presumably very similar jurisdictional issues in September 2024 and a year later, before partially overlapping tribunals.

    In addition, Procedural Order No 2 (dated 28 March 2024) briefly notes Zeph’s withdrawal of its application for interim measures (filed 7 November 2023 before the Zeph II arbitration tribunal), on 12 February 2024. According to paragraph 2.1, that application seems largely to have requested measures similar to those sought in the first Zeph arbitration, but additionally asking the tribunal to order Australia ‘to refrain from granting any further environmental offsets or equivalent measures over land or property owned by the Claimant or its subsidiaries’. Zeph’s withdrawal, to avoid any hearing and decision, promotes efficiency as on 17 November 2023 the first Zeph arbitration tribunal dismissed or ruled premature the quite similar requests for interim measures.

    Thirdly, Zeph v Australia (III) focuses on a Queensland Land Court judgment recommending against a coal mine application by Waratah Coal. This dispute includes allegations of bias on the part of its President Kingham, according to a Notice of Intention to Commence Arbitration (albeit again under SAFTA, dated 20 October 2023) that the Australian government has made public. There is otherwise little public information available yet about this case, including when the actual Notice of Arbitration was filed.

    Overall, it is unfortunate that Notices of Dispute or Intention to Commence Arbitration and Notices of Arbitration, let alone Responses from Australia, are not uniformly made public. Such documentation, very important to understand the key factual and legal issues in the cases, is not mentioned in the Procedural Orders on transparency in the first two Zeph arbitrations, but those Orders do reason that the starting principle underlying AANZFTA is transparency.

    In addition, it is noteworthy that the Zeph II arbitration webpage does not contain Terms of Appointment of the arbitrators, as for the first arbitration. There is also no decision on the seat in the Zeph II arbitration, but its Procedural Order No 3 ends by noting that it is Geneva. Perhaps Australia agreed to that after the first Zeph arbitration tribunal ruled as such in favour of Zeph, or a the second Zeph tribunal so ruled but did not give any reasons for the decision on the seat (as the UNCITRAL Rules, in Article 34(3), only require reasons for awards).

















    “Rule-based International Traceability of Critical Raw Materials Supply Chains”

    Written by: A/Prof Jeanne Huang & Prof Luke Nottage

    This is the theme for our project (with Jeanne Huang as one Chief Investigator) funded recently by the University of Sydney, jointly with institutional partner Fudan University (Shanghai). The sub-theme is “Climate and Environmental Justice between China, Australia, and Other Selected Countries”, including Japan. It is part of series of research projects aimed at advancing the UN’s Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), and involves also from our Sydney Business School Prof Hans Hendrischke (specialist in China). The other Chief Investigator from the Fudan University side is A/Prof Ping Jiang, assistant director of the Department of Environment Science and Engineering.

    Abstract: “The US Inflation Reduction Act and the EU Digital Product Passport both underscore the urgent need for enhanced Environmental, Social, and Governance data traceability across Australian miners, Chinese processors, and US/EU regulators and consumers of critical raw materials (CRM) like Lithium. Addressing this need, this project explores how to establish a rule-based traceability framework to foster sustainable CRM supply chains between Australia, China, the US, and the EU. It adopts a multifaceted approach, incorporating law-business-engineering interdisciplinary research, interviews, case studies, conflict-of-law concepts, and comparative law methodology to address cross-border legal and ethical tensions and promote circular economy within CRM supply chains. It aims to use traceability to enhance transparency, visibility, and trust in CRM supply chains, and promote responsible sourcing and consumption, crucial for global digitalization, electric vehicles deployment, energy transition, and ultimately achieving the UN Sustainable Development Goals.”

    The first of many planned research outputs planned through to mid-2025 is our presentation (slides here) on 12 July 2024 at the “Law and Sustainability” conference at the University of Sydney, co-organised with Singapore Management University and Hong Kong University (program and other details here). We look forward to feedback as we develop our presentation, “Private International Law and Sustainable Development: Establishing International Traceability of Critical Raw Materials Supply Chains” into a full paper that assesses and adapts models particularly from international dispute resolution (arbitral award and judgment recognition) and other international treaty regimes to facilitate recognition of CRM certificates in cross-border supply chains.

    Consumer Law Compared and Refreshed

    [Update of 4 December 2024: in my presentation tomorrow at the annual Australasian Consumer Law Roundtable, hosted by Deakin U in Melbourne’s CBD, I will present an updated version of my 2024 CCLJ article with Prof Souichirou Kozuka comparing consumer law administration, contracts and product safety. This will mention my Submissions (linked below) to three recent federal Treasury-led public consultations (perhaps prompted by a general election due by May 2025!) into (i) facilitating the Australian government adopting foreign standards for minimum safety of specific goods, (ii) adding civil pecuniary penalties for consumer guarantee remedies not provided by suppliers (including regarding safety, as an aspect of “acceptable quality” for goods), and (iii) a generic unfair commercial practices prohibition. Japanese consumer law has none of these features, but each raises interesting issues. Update of 6 January 2026: on the last-mentioned, see also my media commentary here.]

    Yesterday (28 June 2024) I enjoyed attending the ACCC National Consumer Congress in sunny Sydney (program here). This annual invitation-only event provides an excellent opportunity to discuss cutting-edge law and policy issues with new and old colleagues working in Australian state and federal governments, consumer NGOs, businesses and academia (more limited, but I am pictured here with QUT’s Nicola Howell [expert in consumer credit, co-convenor of the academic-focused annual Consumer Law Roundtable] and Dr Catherine Niven [expert in product safety regulation, major contributor to my ARC Discovery Project on child product safety begun before the pandemic- with our last research output published in 2023 here] and Monash Em Prof Justin Malbon [co-author of my 2019 book on ASEAN Consumer Law Harmonisation, with UMelb Prof Jeannie Paterson who had to attend the Congress virtually this year]). It would be good to see more such events bringing together such stakeholders in Japan (compared with in my recent CCLJ article with Souichirou Kozuka), ASEAN and other Asian states.

    The first session was on “Buying in Australia – Are We Safe?”. The answer was “No” from panellists including Catherine (except perhaps one speaker). The opening speaker gave a moving account of how long and traumatic the process was to secure a mandatory product safety standard around button batteries, which were fatally ingested by her infant Bella. Another early fatality involving Britney was highlighted in my 2020 piece for The Conversation (leading to an ABC radio interview). That related also to my then Journal of Consumer Policy article arguing that the Australian Consumer Law did need to add an EU-style “general safety provision” (GSP) to fill gaps so suppliers switched to a more pro-active approach to risk assessments to ensure only safe consumer products were put onto the market, rather than waiting for accidents or risks to be identified and then conduct “voluntary” recalls of unsafe goods (mainly then only to avoid potential product liability claims for compensation and/or adverse reputational effects). In my comments at the Congress, I mentioned that after Canada added such a requirement in 2010, its recall rates went down; and when Singapore added a partial GSP (requiring all products to comply with EU, specified American or ISO standards) there were immediately fewer unsafe toys on their market. Yet the Treasury-led Consultation in 2020 into adding a GSP has led nowhere.

    As alternatives, it seems, we find from late 2021 a further Consultation about allowing foreign standards to be adopted into the ACL (which I commented was a no-brainer) and another Consultation into allowing civil penalties for suppliers not providing remedies to consumers from defective – including unsafe – products under mandatory consumer guarantees (which I suggested was rather broad-brush and indirect, compared to ex ante regulation).

    I also mentioned that unfortunately the written Submissions made by myself and others to all three Consultations have still not been made public. This is also true of the 2023 Consultation into adding to the ACL a general unfair trading prohibition (as under EU, US or Singaporean law). That would go beyond existing ACL prohibitions on misleading or unconscionable conduct to better address eg “dark patterns” facilitated by new technologies (such as “subscription traps” that the ACCC CEO reiterated at the Congress remain a concern). There were moves to make public Submissions to that Consultation (including mine, reproduced here for convenience and giving as an example such a subscription trap laid by The Economist magazine) and they were disclosed from 28 June (the day after the ACCC Congress) noting “79 submissions were received for this consultation, including 8 confidential submissions”. But in principle I believe such consumer law reform consultations should automatically make public submissions unless confidentiality is requested. That is now common good practice across Australian law reform bodies, including the Productivity Commission. In the same vein, Australia’s consumer law reform agencies should publicise at least a short report stating whether and why they may not be proceeding with ACL amendments.

    I ended my comments by alerting Congress attendees to new developments in the EU that intersected with concerns raised by the panelists. The new General Product Safety Regulation requires suppliers to document product risk assessments (and implement traceability measures), notify regulators of progress on recalls, set up a public complaints portal (as the US has had for over a decade, but was not recommended in the 2017 ACL Review report) and make mandatory for online platforms some requirements (like responding within set time frames to complaints about unsafe products) that larger firms had adopted voluntarily under the 2018 EU Product Safety Pledge (mirrored by Australia’s 2020 Pledge). The EU Product Safety Pledge has itself been updated, and existing firms have re-signed it, to allow eg regulators to have access to the platforms’ portals to better monitor them for unsafe products.

    The EU’s Product Liability Directive, which was adopted in 1992 has also recently been revised to better address new technologies and trends. For example, Article 7 makes an online platform jointly liable for harm if it suggests to an average consumer that products are provided either by the online platform itself or by a recipient of the service who is acting under its authority or control. However a recent comparative law article that Jeannie Paterson co-authored (and I helped with) noted a risk that platforms will avoid this liability potential by website and other disclaimers about exercising control over the suppliers. The article contrasts Californian cases against Amazon and other legal concepts that go further in imposing shared liability on such platforms, including pros and cons of such initiatives.

    The second Congress session was on “Justice delayed: strengthening consumer dispute resolution in Australia”. Panellists highlighted persistent problems of access to justice, focusing initially on (prolific) defective vehicles and National Disability Insurance Scheme services. Although Prof Kozuka and I also highlight problems in Japan, I think Australia can do better in various ways. For example, because of the evidentiary issues raised in tribunals or magistrates’ courts, regulators should first more pro-actively use their ACL powers since 2010 to bring representative actions against suppliers who claim for example that cars or other complex products comply with the consumer guarantee of acceptable quality, such as reasonable durability. They can also support consumer NGOs who could run such test cases (eg to to determine how long a mid-value washing machine should last) and then publicise the outcomes, to help facilitate future negotiations and settlements.

    Secondly, the NSW Office of Fair Trading should actually use its powers (added before the COVID-19 pandemic) to order suppliers to compensate consumers for up to $3000 in harm caused by products not complying with consumer guarantees, and publicise this among suppliers and consumers. Other jurisdictions should add such powers too, especially as the ACL is supported to be uniform across Australia. It is true that some suppliers may contest such orders. But they will also likely do that if and when the ACL adds powers for all consumers regulators to order civil pecuniary penalties for major failures, as mooted in late 2021 Consultation (paralleled by the Productivity Commission’s recommendations from an inquiry into Rights to Repair). Decisions from tribunals and courts, even at lower levels, will help clarify the meaning of general terms like reasonable durability.

    Thirdly, we should introduce effective public complaints registers across Australia. Most jurisdictions lack them. And for example the NSW register does not differentiate by sales volumes or other measures of scale, making it hard for consumers or their advisors to determine if one supplier is really better or worse than others. These and other questions were raised in a 2017 Report by the Productivity Commission and should be revisited to improve access to consumer redress (and indeed informed purchasing decisions).

    The third Congress session was on “Regulating for real people: understanding consumer behaviour to drive effective markets”. In his thought-provoking introduction (kindly shared now here), Consumers Federation of Australia chair Gerard Brody highlighted observed limits even with “nudges”, for example regarding electricity contract switching, and asked why suppliers shouldn’t just promise or be required to automatically put customers on the best plan. The CEO of (peak NGO) Consumers NZ pointed out that past consumption patterns may not be a good guide. I also wonder about handing over so much power and data to suppliers, and making consumers too passive (which is partly why for unfair contract terms regulation the price and subject matter cannot be impugned: consumers are assumed to be able at least to investigate and consider those, provided these items are not presented in a misleading way). A better solution might be electricity bills that say “if you switched to our Plan B you would save $XXX dollars” and then the customer could opt-in. [Update of 4 December 2024: after a recent problem with my electricity company in NSW, which had stated something like this on their bills but in a confusing way, I now am more amenable to Gerard Brody’s suggestion for an automatic “upgrade”.]

    The Consumers NZ CEO provided an update on the progression of a private Member’s Bill to introduce a right of repair for New Zealand, including around spare parts availability, and likely mandatory labelling about durability (as recommended also by the Productivity Commission’s Right to Repair report). Again, I would add that the EU provides some good lessons for the antipodes (and say Japan). In February 2024 the EU institutions reached provisional agreement to enact the Right to Repair Directive, as part a larger environmental initiative aiming to extend a product’s life cycle and support a circular economy. Relevant features compared to the ACL regime (which for example allows the supplier not consumer to chose between repair and replacement):

    “The Directive will require producers to carry out repairs outside of the legal guarantee for products covered by repairability obligations under certain EU ecodesign regulations listed in an Annex … [likely beginning with] certain white goods (including household washing machines, dishwashers and refrigerators), vacuum cleaners, electronic displays, and mobile phones and tablets (among others)

    … [requirements for] information on certain spare parts to appear on a website, making them available to all parties in the repair sector and preventing certain practices that can hinder repair – including contractual clauses or certain software- and hardware-related barriers

    … [seemingly] loan devices to be provided to consumers while they wait for repair in certain cases and to enable a consumer to opt for a refurbished unit as an alternative

    … Under the existing Sale of Goods Directive, the seller is liable to the consumer for any lack of conformity which exists at the time when the goods were delivered and which becomes apparent within two years of that time. In the event of non-conformity, the Sale of Goods Directive sets out a hierarchy of remedies, allowing consumers to initially choose between repair and replacement … to encourage consumers to choose repair over replacement, the legal guarantee under the Sale of Goods Directive would be extended by 12 months following a repair …”.

    This EU development also intersects with greenwashing, and the hot topic of the last Congress session – “Lightbulb moments: bold ideas to help consumers play a meaningful role in the green transition”.