Guest Blog – Corruption and Investment Arbitration in Asia: New Frontiers

Written by: Corinna Chen (CAPLUS research assistant, 2024)

On 1 August 2024, the University of Sydney Law School hosted an insightful seminar jointly presented by its Centre for Asian and Pacific Law (CAPLUS) and the Australian Network for Japanese Law (ANJeL). The event featured the local re-launch of a new book titled Corruption and Illegality in Asian Investment Arbitration (Teramura, Nottage and Jetin eds, published in Open Access in Springer’s Asia in Transition series in April 2024) as well as discussions on the latest research in the field.

Professor Simon Bronitt, immediate past Dean of Sydney Law School with personal research interests in criminal law and Indonesia, opened the session with a brief welcome and address. Assistant Professor Nobumichi Teramura from Universiti Brunei Darussalam – lead co-editor of the new book – then presented an overview of the book’s aims, research questions and key findings (also summarised in a recent piece here and in the East Asia Forum). Professor Luke Nottage from the University of Sydney, also co-editor, complemented this by sharing empirical results from his recent research on corruption-related provisions in international investment agreements (IIAs).

Various other contributing authors also spoke on their areas of focus within the book. These included Professor Vivienne Bath from the University of Sydney discussing China and the Hong Kong SAR, Professor Simon Butt from the University of Sydney and Antony Crockett from Herbert Smith Freehills (Hong Kong) discussing Indonesia, as well as additional commentary from Dr Amokura Kawharu, President of the New Zealand Law Commission. The seminar concluded with closing remarks from the Honourable Wayne Martin AC KC, former Chief Justice of Western Australia, who officiated the book re-launch.

* * *

Despite avid efforts to combat corruption through international treaties and domestic legislation, corruption and illegality in foreign direct investment (FDI) remains prevalent across many Asian countries. Associate Professor Teramura highlighted this as the key motivation behind the project, emphasising the book’s focus on illustrating ‘Asian’ perspectives towards corruption in investment arbitration and exploring the potential for significant Asian states to become ‘rule makers’ rather than ‘rule takers’ in this field (PDF of Powerpoints here). 

The research examines the practical impacts of corruption on FDI and local economies in Asia, as well as how illegality in foreign investment projects and disputes have been dealt with across various Asian jurisdictions such as China, Hong Kong, India, Japan, Lao Republic, the Philippines, the Republic of Korea and Thailand. Associate Professor Teramura noted that while some ‘Asian approaches’ are emerging, they are still far from establishing a uniform stance across the region.

The book concludes by proposing a roadmap for developing a more cohesive Asian approach. This includes establishing a regional forum for discussing FDI-related corruption, developing unified rules for handling corruption in investment arbitration, and considering the creation of an independent institution or permanent court to address allegations of corruption in Asian investment disputes.

Following this, Professor Luke Nottage presented compelling insights from his recent paper co-authored with Associate Professor Teramura: “Corruption-related Provisions in East and South Asian Investment Agreements: An Empirical Analysis” (PDF of Powerpoints here). The study revealed a nuanced and often rational approach by Asian countries in negotiating bilateral investment treaties, particularly in their treatment of anti-corruption provisions and legality clauses. 

The research found that net FDI-exporting countries like Japan tend to prefer anti-corruption provisions (59%) over direct legality clauses (16%) in their IIAs, aligning with the aim to reduce corruption in investment destinations and protect their outbound investors. Conversely, net FDI-importing countries such as China are more likely to include legality clauses (95%) and almost no anti-corruption provisions, as the former can be invoked to protect their government and domestic taxpayers from inbound ISDS claims. Overall, the empirical analysis found largely rational treaty drafting practices around these two types of provisions across most countries, based on their FDI status. 

However, Professor Nottage noted some curious exceptions to this rationality, particularly in the case of Singapore. Despite being virtually corruption free, Singapore rarely includes anti-corruption provisions in its IIAs (only 4%) but retains many legality clauses (61%). This apparent irrationality might be related to Singapore’s outbound FDI often coming from government-linked companies. Such instances of “bounded rationality” or status quo bias provide valuable insights for policymakers and IIA drafters, emphasising the need to consider these complex dynamics when addressing corruption and illegality in international investment frameworks. He concluded with the observation that although most countries appear to be acting rationally with regard to their national interests, such approaches may not be entirely conducive towards addressing the overall prevalence of corruption in the Asian region. 

Professor Vivienne Bath then presented insights on China and Hong Kong, based on her chapter with former student Dr Tianqi Gu. In particular, she highlighted several inconsistencies in China’s stance towards eliminating corruption. While China has increasingly sought to tackle these issues through extensive regulations, anti-corruption campaigns and signing the UNCAC, there is a notable lack of transparency with investigations and details of cases, both domestically and in investor-state dispute settlement proceedings. Official Chinese court databases feature very few corruption cases relating to foreign investors or FDIs. Professor Bath also pointed out the absence of legislation addressing corruption by companies and officials outside China, raising this as an important area for future development. 

Antony Crockett and Professor Simon Butt spoke on Indonesia, which is infamous for having high levels of corruption across its numerous levels of government. The pervasiveness of corruption in the Indonesian government was illustrated by reference to the three high-profile cases of Churchill / Planet Mining, Al Warraq and Rafat. They noted that judicial corruption dramatically increases the attractiveness of international commercial arbitration, as commercial parties lack confidence in the judiciary and therefore refuse to settle disputes locally. An in-depth analysis of corruption in Indonesian courts can be found in Professor Butt’s recent book, Judicial Dysfunction in Indonesia. This details 30 trials involving allegations of corruption against judges from the supreme court, constitutional court, administrative court, and most disconcertingly, the anti-corruption court itself.

Finally, Dr Amokura Kawharu, who wrote the foreword to the book, briefly discussed the perspective of New Zealand, currently ranked the third least corrupt country in the world. Despite this, New Zealand only ratified the UNCAC and enacted anti-corruption legislation in 2015. This, according to Dr Kawharu, might be explained by the difficulty policymakers face in competing for space on the legislative agenda, an issue compounded by the country’s short 3-year parliamentary terms.

The Hon Wayne Martin AC KC concluded the evening’s discussions with his perspective on the importance of continued efforts to tackle corruption and illegality, which strike at the heart of the rule of law. He added some caution towards the idea of establishing a permanent international court, citing practical challenges such as the inability to attract strong candidates for the bench as well as the customary process of state appointments giving rise to further risks of nepotism.

Zeph v Australia ISDS Arbitration Claims under AANZFTA

[Some of the background below is included in my posting on the Kluwer Arbitration Blog on 15 September 2024 entitled “Aggravating Australia’s Arbitration Ambivalence: Zeph’s ISDS Claims“. I conclude:

“… Overall, the Zeph claims against Australia, as well as parliamentary inquiries into ratification of IIAs like AANZFTA’s Second Protocol, are therefore likely to aggravate rather than assuage concerns in Australia over ISDS rekindled by the Labor Government’s new policy. This is despite tribunal rulings like those mentioned at the beginning [of the Blog posting, on interim measures], and considerable transparency in these multiple forums. Governments and stakeholders therefore need to work harder to promote productive debate and seek workable ways forward. An EU-style investment court or key features can be a useful discussion point for Australia and its counterparties to IIAs.”

***

The opportunity for nuanced public debate about Australia’s Labor Government’s late 2022 reversion to eschewing ISDS, and my proposed compromise of an EU-style investment court alternative process or key features thereof (such as a standing panel of arbitrators or an appellate review mechanism), is complicated politically by a succession of ad hoc arbitration claims brought by Singapore-incorporated Zeph. Controlled by Clive Palmer and his subsidiaries based in Australia, Zeph has filed several claims since 2023 under the 2021 UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules, pursuant to the investment chapter of the original AANZFTA (signed in 2009) rather than the Second Protocol agreed in 2022 and expected to be ratified by Australia from mid-2024 (after the positive recommendation from JSCOT’s inquiry in which I gave evidence). Those objecting to retaining ISDS in the Protocol, albeit subject to a Work Program where the states party agreed to review whether ISDS should be retained, highlighted these Zeph claims. However, the JSCOT Report did not specifically mention the claimant, and its links to Australian mining magnate and former right-wing politician Clive Palmer.

The first Zeph v Australia arbitration claim (commenced on 29 March 2023) impugns Western Australia legislation enacted in 2020 (unsuccessfully challenged under Australian constitutional law) interfering with rights awarded to his subsidiary Mineralogy in 2002 regarding an iron ore project, as confirmed by two commercial arbitration awards. By preventing also access to judicial and administrative review, the claim appears strong on the merits, as elaborated in a publically available Notice of Dispute of 14 October 2020 (albeit under the Singapore-Australia FTA) evoking breach of fair and equitable treatment, non-discrimination and other protections. However, the jurisdictional objections are significant. Was Zeph incorporated in Singapore (seemingly in 2019) when the dispute was “reasonably foreseeable”, so the tribunal loses jurisdiction under customary international law due to abuse of rights, under the test applied and found to be made out in Philip Morris Asia v Australia? Can Australia further invoke the ‘denial of benefits’ Article 11 in AANZFTA’s Investment Chapter 11, as Zeph is controlled by an Australian and arguably has “no substantive business operations” in Singapore?

Accordingly, interesting legal and factual arguments are expected in hearings scheduled for the week of 16 September 2024 (under Procedural Order No 1), for the arbitration with the seat decided by the tribunal to be Geneva (contrary to Australia’s preference for London as seat). These hearings may take place at the seat in Geneva. However, as the agreed repository for documentation in this first Zeph case is the Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA) in The Hague, parties and the tribunal may instead decide to request use of the PCA’s well-appointed hearing rooms.

Procedural Order No 3 (issued 19 January 2024), setting out transparency in most aspects for this first arbitration, interprets AANZFTA Chapter 11 Article 26.3 to make public such hearings and their transcripts (unless a party seeks and justifies confidentiality around certain information). Paragraph 15.iii of the Order adds that the parties’ “main written submissions shall be published on the PCA website at the end of the hearing to which they relate, subject to any prior redactions” of confidential information).

Procedural Order No 2 largely rejected various interim measures applications by Zeph, including curiously that the JSCOT chair stop making public statements impugning ISDS generally. But some of these applications might be revived (if for example Western Australia invokes indemnities against Palmer and his interests, pursuant to its 2020 state legislation).

Secondly, the Zeph v Australia (II) arbitration impugns measures taken by the Queensland state government relating to a minerals exploration project of Palmer’s subsidiary Waratah Coal. The Attorney-General’s Department revealed to federal Parliament in mid-2023 that Zeph had initiated a second ISDS claim, reportedly by notice of dispute under AANZFTA on 21 February 2023 followed by a formal notice of arbitration on 29 May 2023, seeking around A$41 billion in compensation. The agreed repository for this arbitration is again the PCA in The Hague.

A decision of 26 September 2023, from the agreed Appointing Authority (PCA Secretary-General Dr Marcin Czepkelak) adds that the Notice of Arbitration includes alleged breaches of AANZFTA investment Chapter 11’s articles 6 and 9 (FET and expropriation) concerning the Queensland state government’s “decision to grant an environmental offset to a direct competitor of the Claimant over land in which the Claimant’s subsidiary had certain coal exploration permits”.

The Appointing Authority’s decision rejected Australia’s challenge to Zeph’s nomination of Geneva-based Charles Poncet as arbitrator, based on old proceedings involving in him in Italian courts. Other public sources had indicated that Australia nominated Prof Don McCrae (also for the first Zeph case, and earlier the Philip Morris Asia v Australia case) and that the presiding arbitrator is Laurent Levy (who works in the same Geneva law firm as Prof Kaufmann-Kohler, who is presiding arbitrator in the first Zeph case).

In late July 2024 three Procedural Orders from the Zeph II tribunal were also made available via the Zeph II arbitration’s PCA webpage. The first (dated 25 October 2023) sets the first hearing on preliminary objections as the week of 29 September 2024. Curiously, paragraph 10.5 observes that “In accordance with Article 25(4) of the UNCITRAL Rules, hearings shall be held in camera unless the Parties agree otherwise”.

By contrast, Procedural Order No 3 (25 June 2024) paragraph 2.3 adopts the identical reasoning of the first Zeph arbitration tribunal in the latter’s Procedural Order No 3 on Transparency: AANZFTA’s “Article 26(3) stipulates that information submitted to the Tribunal or to either Party shall be protected from disclosure to the public if specifically designated as confidential. A contrario this implies that, absent such a specific confidentiality designation, the information in the record may be disclosed to the public.” Consistently, later in the Zeph II tribunal’s Procedural Order No 3, paragraph 2.9 notes that the parties agreed to apply certain elements of the first Zeph arbitration tribunal including that: “Hearings (other than procedural conferences) shall be open to the public. … Transcripts of the hearings shall be made public, subject to the redaction of protected information. Sound and/or video recordings should not be made public.” Again, it will be interesting therefore to see from the hearings scheduled for the week of 29 September 2025 (in person or perhaps livestreamed, and via subsequent transcripts and submissions) what jurisdictional objections are raised by Australia, presumably very similar to those being raised in the first Zeph arbitration hearings (scheduled for a year earlier).

Paragraphs 1.3 and 1.4 further note in February 2024 the first Zeph arbitration tribunal had accepted Australia’s proposal to share information with the Zeph II arbitration tribunal, and that in March 2024 the parties agreed to adopt the first Zeph arbitration tribunal’s Procedural Order No 3 concerning procedures to protect any confidential information. Thus, despite there being only Prof Don McRae on both tribunals, there has been some alignment achieved and related procedural efficiencies achieved in the two parallel arbitrations. However, it seems regrettably inefficient for the same parties to hold hearings on presumably very similar jurisdictional issues in September 2024 and a year later, before partially overlapping tribunals.

In addition, Procedural Order No 2 (dated 28 March 2024) briefly notes Zeph’s withdrawal of its application for interim measures (filed 7 November 2023 before the Zeph II arbitration tribunal), on 12 February 2024. According to paragraph 2.1, that application seems largely to have requested measures similar to those sought in the first Zeph arbitration, but additionally asking the tribunal to order Australia ‘to refrain from granting any further environmental offsets or equivalent measures over land or property owned by the Claimant or its subsidiaries’. Zeph’s withdrawal, to avoid any hearing and decision, promotes efficiency as on 17 November 2023 the first Zeph arbitration tribunal dismissed or ruled premature the quite similar requests for interim measures.

Thirdly, Zeph v Australia (III) focuses on a Queensland Land Court judgment recommending against a coal mine application by Waratah Coal. This dispute includes allegations of bias on the part of its President Kingham, according to a Notice of Intention to Commence Arbitration (albeit again under SAFTA, dated 20 October 2023) that the Australian government has made public. There is otherwise little public information available yet about this case, including when the actual Notice of Arbitration was filed.

Overall, it is unfortunate that Notices of Dispute or Intention to Commence Arbitration and Notices of Arbitration, let alone Responses from Australia, are not uniformly made public. Such documentation, very important to understand the key factual and legal issues in the cases, is not mentioned in the Procedural Orders on transparency in the first two Zeph arbitrations, but those Orders do reason that the starting principle underlying AANZFTA is transparency.

In addition, it is noteworthy that the Zeph II arbitration webpage does not contain Terms of Appointment of the arbitrators, as for the first arbitration. There is also no decision on the seat in the Zeph II arbitration, but its Procedural Order No 3 ends by noting that it is Geneva. Perhaps Australia agreed to that after the first Zeph arbitration tribunal ruled as such in favour of Zeph, or a the second Zeph tribunal so ruled but did not give any reasons for the decision on the seat (as the UNCITRAL Rules, in Article 34(3), only require reasons for awards).

















Australia’s Anti-ISDS Approach Again: AANZFTA Protocol To Be Ratified

Around 21 May 2024, after I had presented a submission and oral evidence at a public hearing late March, the Australian Parliament’s Joint Standing Committee on Treaties (JSCOT) issued its Report 215 agreeing that the Australian government should proceed to ratify the ASEAN Australia NZ Agreement for a Free Trade Area (AANZFTA) Second Protocol. This is despite the Labor Government in November 2022 declaring that it will not agree to any form of investor-state dispute settlement (ISDS), relevantly arbitration, in future treaties; and will approach counterparties seeking to remove or otherwise revise ISDS provisions under existing treaties. The Protocol includes a Work Program to review the ISDS provisions, within 18 months of coming into force, which will proceed largely in parallel to a review of the investment chapter also in the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) FTA, which might involve adding ISDS provisions, as it includes the same 12 states party but also three big FDI exporting economies that have generally favoured ISDS: Japan, Korea and China.

In the JSCOT inquiry into ratifying the AANZFTA Second Protocol, the Australian Council of Trade Unions (ACTU) and a small NGO (the Australian Fair Trade and Investment Network, AFTINET, which has persistently objected to ISDS in IIAs in parliamentary inquiries) recommended against ratification due to the Second Protocol retaining ISDS for at least the next few years. My Submission recommended ratification, explaining some of the context for ISDS (along the lines and other cited writings mentioned above) and appending my 2020 Submission to DFAT’s review of old IIAs (reiterating where the Second Protocol’s work programme might make some further drafting improvements around ISDS, especially to further enhance transparency and efficiency). We three were then invited to give (concurrently) oral evidence to JSCOT on 25 March 2023.[1]

The ACTU and AFTINET presented a very broad (and curiously similar) definition of ISDS:  a procedure giving corporations additional rights to sue governments for compensation if they can argue a change in law or policy will harm or impinge on their future profits. They also both highlighted the three claims recently brought under AANZFTA against Australia by Zeph (a Singapore-incorporated company controlled by Australian mining magnate and politician Clive Palmer) and more generally the risks of regulatory chill to sovereign states particularly from fossil fuel investors, as well as the costs of defending claims even when states prevail. (Similar arguments were presented in the Open Letter from Australian academics and lawyers opposing ISDS, circulating from May 2024.[2]) AFTINET also asserted that there was no good evidence that ISDS-backed IIAs promoted FDI flows and that recent IIAs were omitting ISDS – including supposedly for India and New Zealand, but also the EU and Brazil.

My own evidence countered that ISDS claims require additionally proof of violation of substantive commitments offered by host states, that the Zeph claims face difficulties and anyway Australia does not close down its courts due to occasional aggressive litigants, while its outbound investors also protect their investments abroad through ISDS claims – particularly against states with governance issues. I also reiterated that there is some evidence ISDS-backed IIAs promote cross-border FDI, developing economies are failing to attract sufficient FDI to support the global energy transition,[3] and many states (including also eg Indonesia, India and Vietnam) are still offering ISDS in IIAs despite experiencing some inbound claims.


[1] The transcript of this Evidence is at ‘Second Protocol to Amend the Agreement Establishing the ASEAN-Australia-New Zealand Free Trade Area (ANAZFTA) Public Hearings’, Parliament of Australia (Transcript) <https://www.aph.gov.au/Parliamentary_Business/Committees/Joint/Treaties/AANZFTASecondProtocol/Public_Hearings> and the video-recording is at https://www.aph.gov.au/News_and_Events/Watch_Read_Listen/ParlView/video/2299575.

[2] Open Letter on ISDS (May 2024) <https://docs.google.com/forms/d/e/1FAIpQLSddWDUB2NzZAHYlGJDOxg0DiA-JySOGEE7f_09ZdwQNhryr3g/viewform>.

[3] ‘World Investment Report 2023’, United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (Report) <https://unctad.org/publication/world-investment-report-2023>.

When JSCOT’s Report 215 was issued, contrary to my expectation and curiously as this departs from her party’s past practice where a treaty includes ISDS, the Greens Senator for Western Australia Dorinda Cox did not issue a dissenting report – nor even seemingly attend either parliamentary hearing. The Report’s summary emphasised that:[1]

“Notably, Australia successfully negotiated a review of the existing ISDS provisions in [… marking] an instalment of the Government’s commitment to review ISDS provisions in agreements where they already exist, while ensuring Australia does not agree to ISDS mechanisms in new agreements.”

The Report’s Conclusions added (after noting my call for transparency around this ongoing Work Program):[2]

“Considering the significant interest in this issue demonstrated by a range of stakeholders in this and previous JSCOT inquiries, the Committee will seek an update on the progress of the ISDS review work program commitment in due course, and in any case would expect the Department [of Foreign Affairs and Trade: DFAT] to draw any notable developments to the Committee’s attention.”

The Report also quoted evidence given by DFAT that it “will obviously be coming to government to seek a mandate for the positions that we take into that review’ of ISDS under the Work Program”.[3]

Interestingly, the Report did not specifically mention the Zeph claims, although it stated:[4]

“At the public hearing submitters to the inquiry pointed out that there are currently ISDS actions afoot, some of which involve arrangements between Australia and ASEAN nations. The Committee inquired as to the cost of these legal actions to the Australian taxpayer. The Attorney-General’s Department (AGD) said ‘the Attorney-General and the Prime Minister have instructed us to vigorously defend those matters and we are in the process of doing so, and that does accrue cost.

In addition, after recording the opposition to ISDS and hence treaty ratification from the ACTU and AFTINET, the Report noted my concerns about relying solely on more politicised inter-state dispute settlement or arbitration agreed under individual investment contracts, before observing:[5]

The Committee sought clarification as to the recent trend away from ISDS. Professor Nottage said, ‘I think that’s a good thing—that we try something; it has an effect; we realise some of its problems, so we try to fix the problems […] and come up with a new compromise solution’.

My quoted statement in fact followed more specifically from my observation about the question of a ‘retreat from the high water mark of pro-ISDS approaches’.[6] The Committee also did not go on to mention my point immediately following in evidence that the EU has not abandoned direct claims by foreign investors altogether, but come up instead with the investment court compromise. I had suggested that this model could be considered by Australia (and regional states) in future treaty practice even when not negotiating with the EU, for example in the ongoing review of ISDS under AANZFTA’s Second Protocol and RCEP. (Subsequently I developed this proposal in a letter dated 10 April to the Trade Ministers of Australia and New Zealand.)

Furthermore, the Report did not mention my written Submission urging again specific improvements, including restrictions on ‘double-hatting’ and compulsory mediation before arbitration.[7] Overall, therefore, it seems that parliamentary interest and scrutiny around the specifics of ISDS or possible alternatives remains quite limited, deferring largely to the executive branch of government.


[1] Report 215: AANZFTA Second Protocol, available at Parliament of Australia <https://www.aph.gov.au/Parliamentary_Business/Committees/Joint/Treaties/AANZFTASecondProtocol/Report>, xv.

[2] ibid, para 2.95 (and 2.79).

[3] Ibid, para 2.74.

[4] Ibid, para 2.75. This level of generality may reflect a compromise reached between the Labor and Greens members (who might have preferred to mention Zeph and Clive Palmer specifically) and the Coalition members in drafting the joint Report.

[5] Ibid, para 2.80.

[6] Idem.

[7] Available at Parliament of Australia, <https://www.aph.gov.au/Parliamentary_Business/Committees/Joint/Treaties/AANZFTASecondProtocol/Submissions>.

Compromise way forward on investment treaty/FTA (re)negotiations

[On 10 April 2024, following my submission and then oral evidence given to the Australian parliament inquiring into the AANZFTA Second Protocol ratification, I wrote as follows to the respective Trade Ministers of Australia (Hon Don Farrell) and New Zealand (Hon Todd McClay). The latter’s response dated 29 April, quite non-committal, is below and here. I also had (confidential) discussions with DFAT officials on 23 May 2024 regarding my proposal.]

I am a New Zealander working in Australia since 2001, specialising in international business law including international and domestic investment law and dispute resolution.[1] I have provided many submissions to Australian parliamentary inquiries into ratifications of bilateral investment treaties or investment chapters of Free Trade Agreements (FTAs), including giving related evidence on 28 March 2024 urging ratification of the Second Protocol to the (ASEAN+2) AANZFTA.[2] Representatives from the Australian Council of Trade Unions and AFTINET (Australian Fair Trade and Investment Network) opposed ratification of the Protocol especially as it retained investor-state dispute settlement (ISDS) provisions, albeit to be revisited in a Work Program. The latter will run largely in parallel to negotiations to consider instead adding ISDS to the ASEAN+5 Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP), which FTA also involves Australia and New Zealand.

Australia’s Labor Government from November 2022 has reverted to its stance, when in power over 2011-13, to opposing ISDS in new treaties, but seemingly does not extend this position to protocols to existing treaties like AANZFTA. The Labor Government also will approach counterparty states to review past treaties. Until losing the general election in October 2023, New Zealand’s Labor Government from 2018 had similarly opposed ISDS in new treaties. However, the new Coalition Government may revert to a more flexible approach towards ISDS provisions.

As a compromise way forward for both countries, with significantly shared economic and geopolitical interests, I proposed in the AANZFTA parliamentary inquiry that in that FTA’s Work Program as well as the parallel RCEP (re)negotiations concerning ISDS, serious consideration be given to substituting an EU-style “permanent investment court” hybrid form of dispute resolution to underpin the substantive commitments (like non-discrimination and fair and equitable treatment) offered in such treaties. Unlike ISDS, the foreign investor complainant does not nominate an arbitrator. Instead, the investor’s home state and the host state counterparty select in advance a panel of “judges”, who are then selected to decide the claim (albeit following arbitration rules and issuing awards). The model also provides for a second-tier review, by other adjudicators selected from the panel, for any serious error of law or fact. Such features make this investment court model sufficiently different from ISDS, in my view, to not conflict with the anti-ISDS policy of the current Australia’s Labor Government or the previous New Zealand Labour Government. Yet it still allows for foreign investors to initiate a claim, without having to lobby its home state to press for initiation of an inter-state arbitration. The latter mechanism is also provided in investment treaties, but is rarely used where the more direct ISDS route is available and is much more subject to (geo-)political vagaries – as we observe also with WTO inter-state adjudication.

Further, this compromise investment court model was developed in the EU almost a decade ago after extensive consultation with legal experts and other stakeholders there, and it has since been accepted in FTAs notably concluded by Canada, Singapore and Vietnam.[3] The model is also promoted by the EU in ongoing UN deliberations on reforming ISDS multilaterally. It is in the EU’s negotiating mandate for the FTA being negotiated with Australia, and if it is not accepted then that FTA unfortunately will not include provisions on investment protection (only instead on preferential market access for agreed investments, underpinned solely by inter-state arbitration). That was also the outcome in the FTA between the EU and Japan, which preferred to retain instead ISDS-backed protections for its investors into many individual EU states under older treaties. The New Zealand-EU FTA similarly does not include any provisions on investment protection, yet New Zealand’s outbound investors lack such BITs with individual EU member states. New Zealand’s new Coalition Government might now consider adding a protocol on investment protection, agreeing after all with the EU’s court mechanism, to encourage more cross-border investment flows.

Greater consideration by both New Zealand and Australia to the investment court model would also be useful as each continues to negotiate FTAs with the other non-EU counterparties, including across Asia (such as the Australia-India negotiations to conclude a treaty going beyond trade in goods). It would also open up space for greater bipartisanship with each country and therefore speed up FTA negotiations.

In fact, in late 2017 I wrote to your respective predecessors as Trade Minister with Dr Amokura Kawharu (then a professor at University of Auckland, now President of the New Zealand Law Commission). Drawing on recent research (which I have updated[4]), we urged even then Australia and New Zealand to consider the EU-style investment court model and coordinate more in progressing investment treaty negotiations, including for RCEP.[5] That FTA could then have been more easily and quickly agreed upon, and indeed included India which in 2019 withdrew from negotiations. Closer joint consideration of the investment court model deserves renewed attention from both Australian and New Zealand governments, as they look to (re)negotiate various investment treaties, including still AANZFTA. The investment court model may not be perfect but nothing ever is, and it promises a better way forward than the current flip-flops in each country around traditional ISDS.

I would be happy to confer with you or relevant staff to discuss this further, or provide additional information.

Yours sincerely

Luke R Nottage


[1] Profile and CV at https://www.sydney.edu.au/law/about/our-people/academic-staff/luke-nottage.html. My father (Richard Nottage) was former Secretary of Foreign Affairs in New Zealand and my brother (Hunter) was later Senior Trade Law Advisor with MFAT.

[2] See transcript and Submission via https://www.aph.gov.au/Parliamentary_Business/Committees/Joint/Treaties/AANZFTASecondProtocol

[3] For details see eg Moritz Keller (ed) EU Investment Protection Law: Article-by-Article Commentary (Beck/Hart, 2023).

[4] See eg, on the evolving studies on the impact of ISDS provisions on cross-border FDI, my submission in 2020 to DFAT’s review of Australia’s bilateral investment treaties (available at https://www.dfat.gov.au/trade-and-investment/discussion-paper-review-australias-bilateral-investment-treaties), summarised eg in my chapter “Rebalancing Investment Treaties and Arbitration in the Asian Region”, in Mahdev Mohan and Chester Brown (eds) The Asian Turn in International Investment(Cambridge University Press, 2021) 379-398.

[5] Our 2017 letters can be found at https://japaneselaw.sydney.edu.au/wp-content/uploads/2017/11/2017KawharuNottageTurnbullGovt_Combined_LN01.pdf, via https://japaneselaw.sydney.edu.au/2017/11/nz-renounces-isds-deja-vu/

Australia’s Anti-ISDS Approach Again: AANZFTA Protocol Ratification Hearing in Parliament

On 21 August 2023 Australia signed, with New Zealand and the ten member states of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), the Second Protocol to Amend the Agreement Establishing the ASEAN-Australia-New Zealand Free Trade Area (AANZFTA), after announcing in November 2022 substantial conclusion of the free trade agreement (FTA) review that had commenced in September 2018. This amended treaty added new chapters and updated many others, whereas the first Protocol in 2015 focused on streamlining certification for cross-border movement of goods.

For example, as I noted in my written Submission in January 2024 to the Australian Parliament’s Joint Standing Committee on Treaties (JSCOT) inquiry into ratifying the Second Protocol, it added more provisions on consumer protection generally (in Article 7 of Chapter 17, but setting narrow minimum standards for national laws and not subject even to the inter-state dispute settlement Chapter that could help give those commitments more bite, compared to the Australia-UK FTA signed in 2021) and for e-commerce (Article 18 of Chapter 10, underpinned by inter-state dispute settlement – unlike the ASEAN+5 Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership or RCEP signed in 2020).

However, my Submission and others focused mainly on the Second Protocol’s update to Chapter 11 on Investment. The substantive commitments (in Section A, Arts 1-18) were adjusted largely in line with RCEP’s Investment Chapter, but the main controversy concerned Section B’s retention of the investor-state dispute settlement (ISDS) option allowing arbitration as with the original AANZFTA (in forced from 2010). A week before the Second Protocol was substantially agreed, Australia’s Labor Government had declared on 14 November 2022 that it would not agree to ISDS protections for foreign investors in any future treaties, and would seek to review and remove them in past investment treaties. The New Zealand government had also announced in late 2017 that it would not agree to ISDS in future treaties, mimicking the stance of an earlier Labor (with Greens) Government when in power in Australia over 2011-2013.

Compromises were made when retaining ISDS in the Second Protocol’s Investment Chapter. The parties will first suspend application of the National Treatment commitment (not to discriminate against foreign investors compared to local investors, subject to scheduled country-specific exceptions) for breaches arising within 30 months of the upgrade. This is quite significant as the Second Protocol enlivens a previously inactive (Article 3) obligation for National Treatment. The second compromise is Article 17, providing for a work program to review Section B on ISDS no later than 18 months after the date of entry into force of the Second Protocol, to be concluded within 12 months unless extended by the states party – so probably by the end of 2027. (The program also requires discussion about adding two extra prohibitions of performance requirements in Article 6.1.) Given the Australian Labor Government’s opposition to ISDS, it can be expected to press for the removal or otherwise significant curtailing of Section B on ISDS. However, it faces a general election by May 2025, and if it loses to the Coalition the latter will reinstate a more flexible approach – agreeing to ISDS on a treaty-by-treaty assessment of Australia’s national interests. New Zealand’s Labor Government also lost the general election in October 2023, and its new Coalition Government is also likely to be quite sanguine about retaining ISDS.

In parallel, RCEP’s investment chapter had instead omitted ISDS but Article 10.18 established a work program to reconsider whether or not and how to add ISDS. This negotiation was to be started within two years of this ASEAN+5 treaty coming into force (January 2022 for ten states), to be concluded then within three years – so by the end of 2025. The largest non-ASEAN member states of RCEP with large outbound investments such as Japan, Korea and even China, may press for adding ISDS. However, their outbound investors mostly have anyway at least one other ISDS-backed treaty to invoke even without RCEP (eg Japan and Australia have the CPTPP, even though ISDS was omitted also from their 2014 bilateral FTA).

My Submission, and oral evidence given (with video-recording here) in favour of ratifying the Second Protocol (contrasting with the evidence and submissions opposing ratification from the Australian Council of Trade Unions and AFTINET), identified likely net benefits from ISDS-backed treaties including this one but also options for further drafting improvements, drawing partly on my submission to the 2020 DFAT review of Australia’s standalone bilateral investment treaties. I also urged ongoing transparency and stakeholder involvement in the envisaged work program.

We can expect most JSCOT members to recommend that Australia ratifies the Second Protocol. After all, JSCOT always has a majority of Government parliamentarians on the Committee, and its own minister has already signed the Protocol (after review by Cabinet colleagues). In addition, the Coalition parliamentarians in opposition have always maintained a flexible approach towards ISDS provisions. The solitary Australian Greens member, however, seems likely to recommend against ratification, as its parliamentarians have done on committees considering treaties that contain ISDS provisions. What will be more interesting is what the Labor members say about ISDS, including the evidence given, and what that might imply for Australia’s ongoing negotiations regarding investment agreements with India and the European Union.

Japan’s International Investment, Evolving Treaty Practice and Arbitration Related to Corruption and Illegality

Written by: Luke Nottage and Nobumichi Teramura#

Abstract: This article forthcoming in 55 Journal of Japanese Law (mid-2023), part of an interdisciplinary book project on Corruption, Illegality and Asian Investment Arbitration [including a conference held in Brunei on 29 May 2023 (booklet here) supported by ANJeL and CAPLUS], addresses for Japan the difficult practical and policy question facing arbitration tribunals when a foreign investor claims mistreatment by a host state but the latter alleges that the investment was tainted by corruption or other similar serious illegality. By way of background, Japan emerged from the 1980s as a leading exporter of foreign direct investment (FDI). Yet it has low inbound FDI despite some significant growth since the late 1990s (Part II). This is despite Japan having comparatively very little corruption, which is often problematic for foreign investors (Part III).

To protect and promote outbound FDI after a hesitant start, over the last two decades, Japan has accelerated ratifications of standalone bilateral investment treaties (BITs) as well as investment chapters in free trade agreements (FTAs). Almost all allow foreign investors from the home state to directly initiate investor-state dispute settlement (ISDS) arbitration against host states to get relief from violations of substantive treaty commitments, such as non-discrimination or compensation for expropriation (Part IV.1).

Japan’s investment treaty practice on corruption and illegality is comparatively interesting for two reasons (Part IV.2). First, from around 2007, its treaties have often required host states to take measures against corruption. This should help Japan’s outbound investors, but these obligations are generally weakly phrased. Secondly, Japan’s treaties have been less consistent in expressly limiting their protections to foreign investments made in accordance with host state laws (including against corruption). This may be due to treaty drafters from Japan and counterparty states being less aware of the significance of such express legality provisions, which will often lead tribunals to decline jurisdiction if corruption is established, thus leaving foreign investors without treaty protections. Such outcomes may also incentivise host states to ensure a bribe is taken, to use as a treaty defence if foreign investors ever launch treaty claims, whereas other outcomes for tribunals are possible if there is no express legality provision. Another possibility is that this drafting is deliberate, again to benefit Japanese outbound investors as claimants because the absence of a legality provision renders more difficult defences from host states, which typically have more corruption than in Japan.

Japan may adopt more and clearer legality provisions if it becomes subject to more inbound ISDS arbitration claims, and/or if claims by Japanese outbound investors are mostly against well-governed host states with little scope for corruption. Yet both types of claims remain few (Part V). The shift may therefore come more from other counterparty states pushing for such legality provisions and Japan agreeing in its future treaties to demonstrate its overall commitment to combatting corruption, and to preserve the legitimacy of the ISDS arbitration system (Part VI).


# Respectively: Professor, University of Sydney Law School; Assistant Professor, Institute of Asian Studies, Universiti Brunei Darussalam.

“Corporate Environmental Responsibility in Investor-State Dispute Settlement” by Tomoko Ishikawa

[This is my draft review – for the Manchester Journal of International Economic Law – of an excellent new book (Cambridge University Press, 2023, ISBN 978-1-316-51397-2) by one of Japan’s leading international investment law and dispute resolution scholars, Professor Tomoko Ishikawa of Nagoya University’s Graduate School of International Development. She was previously Associate Professor at Tsukuba University and Assistant Professor at Waseda University. Unusually for a Japanese academic, Prof Ishikawa also served as a judge of the Tokyo District Court (2002-5) and working on international law matters in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (2010-12). She has been appointed to the Panel of Conciliators by the Chairman of ICSID over 2017-23. Her research intersects with my current book project with Nobumichi Teramura and Bruno Jetin on corruption and investor illegality in Asian investment arbitration.]

This thought-provoking, extensively researched and well-argued book combines two hot topics for international economic law experts as well as the general public: corporate environmental responsibility, comprising both hard law and voluntary Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) and investor-state dispute settlement (ISDS). It is highly recommended for scholars, practitioners and policy-makers, including national delegates, observers and the Secretariat of the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL) engaged in ongoing multilateral reform deliberations on ISDS since 2019.

Chapter 1 outlines how ISDS arbitration reinforces substantive protections offered through international investment agreements (IIAs) to foreign investors typically going beyond customary international law, notably against discrimination, uncompensated indirect as well as direct expropriation, and violation of fair and equitable treatment (FET) including denial of justice in national courts and administrative procedures. Yet burgeoning IIAs and ISDS cases have highlighted how foreign investment can adversely impact the environment and often related human rights in host states. The book’s key concern is how the ISDS system, which seems “asymmetrical” in only allowing foreign investors to claim against host states, also does or can significantly allow counterclaims by host states to offer relief against environmental degradation.

Professor Tomoko Ishikawa’s well-structured book (pp17-21) devotes the first part of chapter 2 (pp 24-48) to the challenges of regulating and pursuing the responsibility of transnational corporations (TNCs) in domestic legal orders (including poor governance capacity and access to impartial justice), but also the persistent lack of effective general mechanisms internationally. Ishikawa examines the paucity of customary and treaty-based international law obligations and enforcement mechanisms, recent attempts to expand the international human rights obligations of corporations, and some “soft law” instruments to promote corporate social responsibility (including private initiatives involving CSR). The second part analyses 1000 randomly selected IIAs and Model IIAs (pp 49-55). There is a trend especially over 2010-19 to add express provisions reinforcing the host state’s general “right to regulate” (such as “no lowering of standards” or general exceptions clauses). Yet very few IIAs (39) set express investor obligations (plus six out of 56) Model IIAs), although somewhat more (54) refer to voluntary CSR in the preamble or especially main text (plus 11 Model IIAs), and both types of provisions have also emerged particularly over the last decade or so.

Chapters 3-5 delve into the procedural mechanism of counterclaims potentially under IIAs. Chapter 3 outlines the benefits compared to pursuing investor responsibility under domestic law (pp 60-65). These include problems with the rule of law (such as judicial corruption, mentioning some notable cases) and cross-border enforceability, which I would add are essentially the flipside of problems faced by foreign investors without (especially ISDS-backed) IIAs.

In addition, Ishikawa deals with a fascinating and little-discussed issue, pointing out that in some cases the actual victims of environmental harm may not benefit from the host state proceeding with a counterclaim. A primary conclusion is that ISDS arbitral tribunals should be able to rule it inadmissible based on due process concerns (as a general principle of international law) if allowing the counterclaim “would result in effective deprivation of remedy for the victims” (p84). One factor in this determination will be the host “state’s representation of the interests of its people” (p84), presumed if it has representative democracy but rebutted for example if the host state colluded with the investor in causing the damage. A second suggested factor is doubts about the distribution to victims of compensation potentially awarded. Nonetheless, Ishikawa rightly concludes that in proving such matters, the investor faces “a difficult task. After all, there is a strong presumption that the host state acts on some public purpose, and tribunals would be very reluctant to interfere with internal political affairs by second-guessing the issues of representation and fair distribution” (p85, footnotes omitted).

Chapter 4 first deals with jurisdiction or consent to counterclaims. Again, Ishikawa makes good use of her empirical dataset. She agrees with some other commentators that treaties’ (typical) “absence of reference to the host state’s right to file a counterclaim, which is already responsive to the principal claim, is a logical choice and does not necessarily indicate the parties’ intention to exclude counterclaims” (p97, footnote omitted). She argues this conclusion is buttressed because 706 IIAs out of the 1000 sample contain seemingly narrow locus standi provisions (only expressly mentioning the investor’s right to claim) but 263 go on to provide narrow definitions of investment disputes and claims (pp 98-99). Only the latter subset of treaties, Ishikawa contends, impede tribunals taking jurisdiction over counterclaims because such IIAs allow only for disputes and claims over host state obligations assumed under the treaty. She further argues that a narrow applicable law clause (not expressly referring to domestic law, but only international law: 140 IIAs and 12 Model IIAs) does not imply exclusion of domestic law in ISDS as tribunals “always possess the incidental jurisdiction to apply domestic law to questions that cannot be answered by international law” (p101).

Nonetheless, the second half of Chapter 4 investigates whether tribunals, despite taking jurisdiction under (most) treaties, should rule counterclaims as inadmissible (pp 104-115). Ishikawa argues that there need only be a factual not legal nexus between the principal claims and counterclaims. More complicated is whether a parent’s counterclaim for damage caused by its subsidiary should be inadmissible due to the principle of limited liability. Ishikawa concludes otherwise, noting for example that investment treaties often allow conversely for parent companies to bring claims on behalf of local companies they control or (more controversially nowadays) have shareholdings in. She further concludes that “the question of whether the parent company directly owes a duty of care or is shielded from liability in a particular case must be considered at the merits stage, in accordance with a careful interpretation and application of the relevant domestic law” (p115). This sub-topic, and perhaps the arguments about jurisdiction presented in this Chapter, nonetheless will likely generate some significant divergences among other commentators and tribunals.

Chapter 5 turns to assessing the merits to be considered by tribunals for counterclaims (pp. Ishikawa first elaborates quite compellingly the argument that tribunals generally can and should apply aspects of domestic law, including those imposing responsibility for environmental harm. Concerns about the legitimacy of international adjudicators applying such laws can be addressed by them adopting a “domestic jurisprudence” approach (like the Permanent Court of International Justice), considering a wide range of domestic law sources (pp 128-9) and more use of local legal experts (although very few sampled treaties provide expressly for tribunals to appoint ex curia experts, and only for factual issues: p 131).

The second half instead considers counterclaims based on international law (pp 135-56). An interesting but ambitious argument is that for some instruments imposing liability on TNCs but not expressly providing for remedies or others not yet implemented into national laws, host states might seek to fill that gap through tribunals applying domestic law (as for example in some US case law). Ishikawa also argues that violation of proliferating CSR commitments through treaties (as well as national laws, evolving corporate practices and representations) might generate civil tort claims under at least some domestic laws.

Having considered an investor’s environmental responsibility as a ground for the host state’s counterclaim, Chapter 6 discusses the effects of such responsibility in assessing the investor’s principal claims. Problems usually arise with environmental harm during the performance phase, and Ishikawa argues that misconduct at that stage will usually have only a limited impact on a tribunal’s jurisdiction and even admission of the claim (pp 159-66). However, when considering the merits, host state liability for lack of FET (especially “legitimate expectations”) can arguably be obviated by the investor’s performance-phase misconduct as part of the principle’s balancing exercise and (more controversially) the evolving notion of a corporation’s “social licence to operate” (pp 166-191). More commonly found in investment arbitration and other international law for a is the application of contributory fault to reduce relief awarded, although Ishikawa urges sufficient reasoned explanation over percentages applied by ISDS tribunals (pp 191-98).

Chapter 7 concludes with “implications for reform”. Although the book mainly argues that there is already most scope for counterclaims under many IIAs than most have appreciated, Ishikawa suggests that more explicit rights to counterclaims in treaties would be useful. Substantively, moreover, treaties should expressly provide obligations on investors to comply with host state laws, but if and when extra international standards are set they should be “clearly specified so as to constrain the interpretative discretion of tribunals” (pp 204-5) and provide secondary rules determining consequences for breach (rather than tribunals having to invoke domestic law).

By contrast, a reform option of requiring exhaustion of local remedies before ISDS claims is unclear concerning the extent this “would contribute to advancing the victims’ interests” given “the known cases suggesting corruption and a lack of political independence in the judiciary in the context of TNCs’ misconduct” (p206). Ishikawa also suggests that the most drastic reforms, allowing host states and affected third parties to initiate claims against TNCs (rather than responding with counterclaims) is better pursued outside the IIA regime (eg through the 2019 Hague Rules on Business and Human Rights Arbitration). Otherwise, the regime including its legitimate interests for investors could unwind: “ISDS reform should strike a careful balance between the need to keep its value for the regime’s participants and the need to advance responsible investment” (p208).

The most detailed reform proposal, not really prefigured in the preceding chapters, involving promoting third party participation in investor-state mediation. This more consensus driven dispute resolution procedure has been promoted in recent years by various institutions and commentators due to growing concerns about ISDS arbitration, including its costs and delays.[1] Ishikawa interestingly highlights how some UNCITRAL reform discussions have mentioned that participation by affected third parties through mediation could allow more public interest to be represented, while some scholars support including “non-disputant” stakeholders in mediation (p213). Various suggestions are made to make this process work well for cases involving alleged environmental harms, including appointing co-mediators with relevant expertise, partially lifting confidentiality and reporting and establishing best practices through capacity building and other initiatives.

However, Ishikawa shares scepticism with some other commentators about reforming IIAs by mandating mediation before arbitration – including through a multilateral instrument retrofitting such a step to old treaties, along the lines of the UN’s 2019 Mauritius Convention on transparency (pp 214-5). She notes only a few treaties currently provide a mandatory mediation step, while acknowledging the 2019 Indonesia-Australia FTA (Art 14.23), 2019 Hong Kong – UAE BIT (Art 8), and the Investment Agreement for the COMESA Common Investment Area (Art 26(4) of the 2007 version).[2] Nonetheless, the general argument that mandating mediation goes against its consensual essence is challenged by developments in domestic legal systems (with courts often requiring some initial good faith mediation attempt) and cross-border resolution (with many contracts now committing to mediation before arbitration). Recent empirical research into investment dispute settlement patterns also challenges other concerns often expressed about mediation.[3] Ishikawa’s proposals for mediation, to involve third parties in resolving disputes involving environmental issues, could therefore be bolder on this point. Overall, this book is comprehensive, erudite and balanced, articulating many compelling insights for a variety of legal experts interested in counterclaims and other mechanisms to reassess ISDS and the IIA system. It richly deserves to inform ongoing debates on ISDS reform in UNCITRAL and other fora internationally and domestically, treaty negotiators, future academic research, and investment arbitration practice – even if some of Ishikawa’s more innovative arguments do not prevail among investment tribunals.


[1] See also eg Claxton, James and Nottage, Luke R. and Williams, Brett G. and Williams, Brett G., Mediating Japan-Korea Trade and Investment Tensions (December 3, 2019). in Nottage, Luke; Ali, Shahla; Jetin, Bruno; Teramura, Nobumichi (eds), “New Frontiers in Asia-Pacific International Arbitration and Dispute Resolution”, Wolters Kluwer, (2021), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3497299 (with an earlier version in Journal of World Trade).

[2] The relevant provision in the latter treaty, as revised in 2017, is Art 34(4)). Ishikawa also refers to the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (Art 9.18) but that does not mandate mediation (emphasis added): “(1) … the claimant and the respondent should initially seek to resolve the dispute through consultation and negotiation, which may include the use of non-binding, third party procedures, such as good offices, conciliation or mediation”. See further: Ubilava, Ana and Nottage, Luke R., Novel and Noteworthy Aspects of Australia’s Recent Investment Agreements and ISDS Policy: The CPTPP, Hong Kong, Indonesia and Mauritius Transparency Treaties (March 4, 2020). in Nottage, Luke; Ali, Shahla; Jetin, Bruno; Teramura, Nobumichi (eds), “New Frontiers in Asia-Pacific International Arbitration and Dispute Resolution”, Wolters Kluwer, (2021) https://ssrn.com/abstract=3548358; and (with James Claxton) http://arbitrationblog.kluwerarbitration.com/2020/09/05/pioneering-mandatory-investor-state-conciliation-before-arbitration-in-asia-pacific-treaties-ia-cepa-and-hk-uae-bit/ (updated and elaborated in Volume XIII of the Indian Journal of International Economic Law (2022) via https://ijiel.in/volume-xiii).

[3] Ubilava, Ana, Amicable Settlements in Investor-State Disputes: Empirical Analysis of Patterns and Perceived Problems (March 13, 2019). Journal of World Investment and Trade, Vol. 21, 2020, pp. 528-557, https://ssrn.com/abstract=3352181; incorporated into her PhD thesis based book (2022) https://brill.com/display/title/63844?rskey=uPsqiO&result=6.

Australia’s (Dis)Engagement with Investor-State Arbitration: A Sequel

A seminar held on 10 November 2022 during the Australian Arbitration Week, organised by the UNCITRAL National Coordination Committee for Australia (UNCCA) and hosted by Allens in Melbourne, discussed “Australia’s engagement in the ISDS [investor-state dispute settlement] reform process”. My presentation divided successive governments’ approach into three significant eras over the last decade or so: anti-ISDS (2011-13), case-by-case ISDS (2014-21), and uncertainty (2022-).

Some of the uncertainty in this current third era has dissipated since the seminar. On 14 November Australia’s current Trade Minister Dan Farrell declared that the new Labor Government “will not include ISDS in any new trade agreements” and would attempt to reduce their impact in existing agreements. On the latter point, he stated that “when opportunities arise, we will actively engage in processes to reform existing ISDS mechanisms to enhance transparency, consistency and ensure adequate scope to allow the Government to regulate in the public interest”. The announcement has already generated concern from commentators from the Business Council of Australia and legal practice, including Dr Sam Luttrell (who also presented at the UNCCA seminar). Below I locate the Trade Minister’s announcement in context and sketch some implications, drawing partly on my 2021 book of selected essays on investor-state and commercial arbitration, focusing on Australia and Japan in regional and global contexts. 

Before this sequel, in the first era beginning in 2011, the centre-left (Labor/Greens) Gillard Government had declared that Australia would no longer agree to any form of ISDS in future bilateral investment treaties (BITs) or FTA investment chapters. That stance derived partly from the Productivity Commission’s recommendation (by majority) in its 2010 report into international trade policy more generally, which favoured more unilateral liberalisation measures and was skeptical about proliferating FTAs from a more laissez faire perspective. On ISDS provisions, the draft and then final reports asserted that there was no good evidence that offering them led to more FDI flows, Australian investors did not invoke investor-state arbitration, and ISDS could lead to “regulatory chill”. Additionally, the Gillard Government anti-ISDS policy from 2011 was driven by concerns from the political left about investment and trade liberalisation generally. It was probably also influenced by Philip Morris Asia initiating the first-ever ISDS dispute against Australia around this time, challenging Australia’s tobacco plain packaging legislation under the (then) BIT with Hong Kong. The anti-ISDS policy delayed conclusion of major FTAs with China, Korea and Japan, large exporters of capital to Australia which pressed for such provisions.

However, after the centre-right Coalition government won the election in late 2013, it reverted to the pre-2011 approach of agreeing to ISDS provisions on a case-by-case assessment. FTAs were soon concluded with China and Korea, including ISDS. The FTA concluded with Japan did omit ISDS, but probably because it did not offer Australia sufficient extra export market access or other benefits, at a time when the Coalition Government had difficulties passing legislation through the upper house of Parliament. Japan’s longer positive experience of investing in Australia also meant it could play the long game and seek ISDS-backed protections through other treaties, which it eventually achieved in fact through both countries ratifying the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership mega-regional FTA (CPTPP, in force for both states from 2019). The Labor Opposition voted with the Government to pass tariff-reduction legislation needed to ratify these ISDS-backed treaties, unlike the Greens, declaring the Labor Party’s continued opposition to ISDS but assessing the FTAs as overall in the national interest.

Additionally over this second era, the Coalition Government omitted ISDS in the PACER-Plus FTA with Pacific Island micro-states, given their limited inbound investment prospects and capacity as host states to defend ISDS claims; and in the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) ASEAN+5 FTA, probably because almost all pairs of its 15 member states have at least one ISDS-backed treaty among themselves anyway. The Coalition Government also renegotiated a few early FTAs and BITs (eg with Singapore, Uruguay and Hong Kong), replacing them with CPTPP-like provisions to clarify provisions or make them somewhat more pro-host-state in light of emerging investment treaty case law. It also solicited public submissions to inform a review of older treaties, although the Government did not then publish a report (let alone any Model BIT) formalising its evolving negotiating preferences. Australia further ratified the Mauritius Convention in 2020 to help retrofit transparency provisions on older treaties, although this will bite primarily only if other states also ratify the Convention and so far few have done so.

Australia’s renewed nuanced approach towards ISDS over 2014-21 may have been influenced by some (but not very strong) evidence, in Asia and more widely, that ISDS provisions do in fact have significant positive impacts on FDI flows. Also, ratifying investment treaties globally certainly impacted FDI, meaning that a minority of states increasingly holding out against all ISDS would have instead reduced ratifications and therefore FDI flows. Other empirical research, highlighted by Dr Sam Luttrell at the recent UNCCA seminar, adds that ISDS-backed treaties reduce the cost of syndicated loan finance for cross-border investors.

Luttrell’s presentation further reinforced how Australian investors (particularly in long-term resources projects) not only take into account ISDS protections but also started commencing outbound investor-state arbitrations under Australian treaties (or contracts) alleging host states have violated their substantive commitments. This is especially so since the successful White Industries v India award in 2010, which the Productivity Commission seems to have been been unaware of. Concerns about “regulatory chill” also seem to have declined as Australia defeated Philip Morris Asia on jurisdiction in 2015 (and Uruguay later defeated the parent company on the merits regarding its own tobacco packaging measures), and as no further inbound ISDS arbitrations were commenced against Australia. Nonetheless, perhaps because ISDS remained a live issue in parliamentary treaty ratification hearings and successive Coalition Governments did not control the upper House, Australia does not seem to have been particularly vocal in multilateral ISDS reform discussions in UNCITRAL or ICSID, although it has participated.

After Labor won the general election in May 2022, the new Government had not publically declared its policy approach towards ISDS, until the Trade Minister’s announcement on 14 November. At the UNCCA seminar the week before, I noted that the foreign ministry’s website still stated that Australia assesses ISDS on a case-by-case assessment. However, setting policy going into the election, the Labor Party’s 2021 National Platform had reiterated that “Labor will not enter into agreements that include ISDS provisions” (p9 para 45). In addition, it stated (p94, paras 33-34):


“Labor in government will review ISDS provisions in existing trade and investment agreements and seek to work with Australia’s trading partners to remove these provisions. While this process is underway, Labor will work with the international community to reform ISDS tribunals so they remove perceived conflicts of interest by temporary appointed judges, adhere to precedents and include appeal mechanisms.

Labor will set up a full time negotiating team within the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade whose sole job will be to negotiate the removal of ISDS clauses …”

Until 14 November 2022, there had been no public announcement about any such initiatives.

* * *

Accordingly, at the UNCCA seminar, I pointed out that Australia’s major ongoing FTA negotiations involving investment were with India (with a provisional agreement reached only on trade related matters) and the European Union. India unilaterally terminated its BIT with Australia in 2017, as part of its broader policy of winding back protections for foreign investors since the White Industries award and successive claims against India under other older treaties. Although India’s new Model BIT from 2016 retains ISDS, it provides a narrow window and its substantive protections are heavily circumscribed, and India has been able to only conclude a few new investment treaties from this negotiating position. Even maintaining the second era’s case-by-case assessment policy, I therefore considered it quite possible that Australia and India could end up agreeing on a parallel investment treaty that leaves only inter-state arbitration, especially if India offered significant preferential market access to Australian investors.

Omitting ISDS is now the only possibility, under the newly announced Labor Government stance, but India now may not offer as much market access or other benefits to Australia. A better compromise, given problems encountered by foreign investors in India as well as JNU Prof Jaivir Singh’s empirical evidence that ISDS-backed treaties cumulatively have had positive impact on FDI inflows for India, could have been a CPTPP-like investment treaty with some further innovations. Those might include a mandatory mediation step before arbitration, as Australia agreed upon (unusually) with Indonesia in 2019 but not with Hong Kong.

Australia is also still negotiating an FTA with the EU. Since 2015, as a partly political compromise internally, the EU offers only an “investment court” alternative to traditional ISDS, on a take it or leave it basis. Singapore took this option, for example, but Japan did not (preferring to stick with pre-existing BIT with EU member states with traditional ISDS, and watching longer term multilateral reform discussions). Australia should probably take the investment court option, to secure an overall better FTA deal, as I have argued (with Prof Amokura Kawharu) also for New Zealand after it too from 2018 mimicked Australia’s first anti-ISDS policy. Arguably, this option is not “ISDS” so it would not conflict with the Labor Party’s 2021 platform and now the 14 November 2022 Labor Government’s anti-ISDS position. Although the EU’s investment court model allows foreign investors the right to directly commence arbitration, they cannot nominate arbitrators; they instead are pre-selected only by the home and host states, and then randomly assigned to hear the claim (and any appeal). If Australia adopts this interpretation of its stance eschewing ISDS, to conclude a deal with the EU, this would also signal to other regional players and UNCITRAL delegates that there is scope to be flexible in investment treaty negotiations.

However, one wild card for Australia has been that a right-wing politician and mining magnate (Clive Palmer) escalated complaints in 2020 by formally seeking consultations with the federal Government and then notifying a dispute through his Singaporean company (Zeph), after unsuccessful constitutional and other domestic law challenges. They allege expropriation and breach of fair and equitable treaty (denial of justice) related to Western Australian state legislation impacting on iron ore rights and related past domestic arbitration awards. Given his high public profile, and rights originally held by his Australian company being transferred to Zeph in Singapore, if and when an ISDS arbitration is commenced (potentially from early 2023) under one of Singapore’s multiple treaties with Australia, this risks another Philip Morris Asia moment. An arbitration filing would certainly rekindle media and political interest in ISDS, which peaked in Australia over 2010-16.

In addition, concerns were reportedly being raised last week about potential ISDS claims brought by Asian and other investors and in Australian gas resources under the Labor Government’s plans to deal with the global energy crisis. Announcing now a renewed anti-ISDS policy may help pre-empt public criticisms in this respect as well. However, any such claims would be preserved under existing treaties, while substantive commitments made under Australia’s treaties (especially FTAs) anyway give the host state considerable scope to introduce emergency measures.

Whatever the impact of these potential claims on its policy-makers, Australia’s renewed anti-ISDS posture will make it even more difficult for RCEP to add ISDS protections, unless the Labor Government backtracks or loses the next elections in 2025. ISDS must be discussed again among member states within 2 years of RCEP coming into force, with a decision then on whether and how to add ISDS to be reached within another 3 years (Art 10.18). Any implications for Australia’s recently concluded review of its FTA with New Zealand and Australia have yet to be spelled out. In addition, the new Labor Government policy will probably have further ripple-on effects particularly across the Asia-Pacific region. It could also potentially impact on wider multilateral discussions about ISDS in UNCITRAL, and even on the “modernisation” of or withdrawal from the ISDS-backed Energy Charter Treaty (which Australia signed in 1994 but never ratified), especially if the Australian government can articulate more specifically the arguments and evidence for adopting this renewed anti-ISDS position.

“Crisis as an Opportunity for Development of Japanese Law”

Following on the inaugural ANJeL-in-Europe symposium organised by Prof Giorgio Colombo for UPavia in late 2019, Dr Wered Ben-Sade and other attendees or associates are participating online in this law-related session on the first day of the Sixth Bi-Annual International Conference of the Israeli Association for Japanese Studies (15-17 November 2022).

Chair: Wered Ben-Sade Bar-Ilan University, Israel

CRISIS AS AN OPPORTUNITY FOR DEVELOPMENT OF JAPANESE LAW
Chair: Wered Ben-Sade
Crises create new opportunities for development, particularly when traditional perceptions and customs (or habits) are questioned and reexamined. Similarly as “Necessity is the mother of invention” (Plato), crises push us out of our comfort zone while simultaneously lowering the risks of change, thus motivating us to operate differently in order to solve them or improve our response. This is true both at the micro, personal level, and at the macro level of society. Understanding this mechanism at the macro level can facilitate us when we encounter a personal crisis and inspire us to search for the opportunity that is encapsulated within.
Five presentations will examine how crises serve as an opportunity for the development of Japanese law, both in the past (from the second half of the 19th century) and now. Some of the most debated challenges that Japan and the world are currently facing, such as inclusiveness of women, legal education, Covid19 impact and sustainability (in the context of corporate governance), will be discussed.

Béatrice Jaluzot Lyon Institute for Political Sciences & Lyon Institute for East Asian Studies
Crisis as an opportunity for development from a historical perspective: The choice of a positivist legal system following the signature of the Unequal Treaties
In the second half of the 19th century, Japan experienced the collapse of a thousand-year-old culture based on the Chinese model and the emergence of a society inspired by Western models. The disappearance of the old regime, caused by the imperialist movements of the time, gave way to a country that was profoundly renewed in all its fundamental structures. Among them, the country’s legal system was one of the essential novelties and one of the main achievements of the new leaders. They were thus able to set up institutions that are still largely those of today. The aim is to present how this legal system is the result of this brutal overthrow of the regime, but also to understand how the accelerated transition from which it emerged took place. This rupture gave rise to the powerful and efficient structures we know today.

Makoto Messersmith University of Hawaii at Manoa, USA
Insights on the possibility of inclusiveness of women in law studies of Japan
When we look at the status quo and history of female law professors in the U.S. and Japan, it shows that unlike the U.S., Japan has not experienced great improvement regarding inclusiveness of women into law studies, yet. Although it seems that Japan has made some efforts to encourage more women to enter the field of law, women in law studies are still facing unique challenges. For instance, in many universities, female law professors are still less than 20%. In my talk, I will explore their challenges and discuss how we can encourage more women to be included in law studies.

Luke Nottage University of Sydney, Australia and Ken’ichi Yoneda, Kagoshima University, Japan
Introducing ICT into Japanese Legal Education:
The Postgraduate Law School Movement and Covid-19 as Cornerstones
This report explains the evolution of online legal education in Japan, particularly in its universities. Three phases can be discerned: before and after the introduction from 2004 of a new postgraduate Law School system to improve and expand core legal professionals, as part of a wider justice system reform program, and a more dramatic expansion prompted by the COVID-19 pandemic since 2020. The Law School reforms had trickled down somewhat to undergraduate legal education, building on and linking to wider nationwide and university-sector initiatives in Information and Communications Technology. This fortunately positioned Japanese legal education quite well for pandemic-related challenges, although the transitions have not been easy.


Ying Hsin Tsai College of Law, National Taiwan University
The Development of Shareholder Activism following the COVID-19 Pandemic
The development of shareholder activism in Japan, thanks to the COVID-19 pandemic, creates new opportunities. The Japanese company law designs assorted ways by which shareholders can participate in shareholders’ meeting, even if they cannot attend in person (e.g. proxy, written voting and electronic voting). Due to the pandemic, the shareholders’ meeting could not be held in-person, and instead these other ways were gradually put to use. In this presentation I will discuss the practical merits and legal drawbacks surrounding these ways. The overall picture that emerges is that while providing a variety of ways for shareholders to participate in the shareholders’ meeting itself can certainly enhance the practice of shareholder activism, how to design these ways in a manner which overcomes the legal issues remains a challenge.


Kozuka Soichiro Faculty of Law, Gakushuin University, Japan
Introducing Sustainability into the Japanese Corporate Governance
Japan’s corporate governance practice is making rapid developments towards engaging with sustainability. Japan has already the largest number of companies in the world, which have announced support for the TCFD (Taskforce on Climate-related Financial Disclosures) framework. The development towards sustainability will probably continue, induced by the external global crisis of the need for sustainability, and by the internal pressure of the institutional investors. In this presentation I will evaluate the current and expected developments. The Japanese nuances in both regulation and practice of corporate governance will also be discussed.

Japan: Sustainable Corporate Governance and ‘Gradual Transformation’

[ANJeL Program Convenor Prof Souichirou Kozuka and I have written a shorter chapter on Japan for the 5th edition of Principles of Contemporary Corporate Governance (by Jean Jacques du Plessis, Anil Hargovan and Jason Harris): see our longer manuscript version reproduced here for the 4th edition published by Cambridge University Press in 2018). As indicated in the introduction below, we pay particular attention to the hot topic internationally of ESG (environmental, social and governance) factors in corporate activity and investment, highlighting changes and (mostly) continuities in the corporate governance system behind Japan’s rapid uptake of ESG and sustainable or responsible investment.]

Japan developed vibrant commercial activity domestically towards the end of the Tokugawa Shogunate era (1603-1867), when it largely closed itself off to the world. As the country re-opened and expanded industrialisation over the Meiji Era (1868-1912), codifications and legal institutions were introduced following the European civil law tradition. Stock exchanges were established and investment grew into often family-owned companies, resulting in considerable emphasis on shareholder primacy before World War II.

However, after the US-led Allied Occupation (1946-51) until at least the 1980s, Japan became renowned for its stakeholder approach to corporate governance. More emphasis was placed on the interests and roles of employees (especially those in “lifelong employment”), creditors (especially “main banks”) and key suppliers or corporate customers (including in “keiretsu” corporate groups, and/or involving significant cross-shareholdings). These three practices influencing corporate governance, only loosely underpinned by relevant legislation, started to unravel after an asset bubble collapsed and Japan entered a “lost decade” of economic stagnation from the 1990s. Growing foreign investment into the Japanese stock market also supported a “gradual transformation” toward more shareholder primacy. This has involved some more protection for minority shareholders, and partial shifts towards a “monitoring” rather than executive board especially in listed companies (as elaborated in Part 11.2 of our new chapter).

The transformation since the 1990s has been reinforced by the creation of a new legislative regime (Part 11.3) and more recent “soft law” Codes for corporate governance and engagement or stewardship by institutional investors (Part II.4). Japan has experienced three major waves in the development of corporate law, at roughly half-century intervals. The Meiji-era Commercial Code enacted around the turn of the 20th century was followed by US-inspired reforms during the post-war Occupation, then much more wide-ranging reforms from around the turn of the 21st century prompted by Japan’s economic slowdown. Even in terms of formal legislative changes, the trajectory has not been one of straightforward ‘Americanisation’, and the overall position now reached is also very different from US law, as evidenced by the partial persistence of the statutory auditor governance structure inspired by German law. Also evident are some influences from – or at least parallels with – aspects of English law. These are epitomised recently in listing requirements, including a ‘comply or explain’ Corporate Governance Code since 2015, and an earlier tendency in takeover regulation to give priority to decisions of shareholders over those of directors. The impact of German law, filtered sometimes nowadays through EU law, remains important too. Japan’s complex corporate law landscape is also influenced by  the three distinctive features of post-War corporate governance practice mentioned above, even though they too have been undergoing gradual transformations.

Much discussion has emerged recently also around ESG issues for investors and managers in Japan, as in many other jurisdictions with large securities markets (Part II.5). A key question is whether this means even-greater shareholder primacy, as foreign institutional investors in particular pushed for further ESG initiatives from Japanese firms, or whether it marks their return towards more stakeholder-based corporate governance. The answer is important for predicting likely future directions (Part II.6).