

# The Prospects and Challenges for International Commercial Arbitration

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ACICA Rules drafting committee (2004-2024)

# Overview

- International Commercial Arbitration (ICA) has been growing, including across Asia (but not much inside Japan, or Australia)
- ICA has multiple advantages over cross-border litigation
  - Takasugi et al 2020, compare some survey evidence both East and West
- Challenges to the traditional advantages of ICA:
  - Enforcement
  - Arbitrator neutrality & expertise
  - Confidentiality
  - Flexible procedures
  - Lack of appeal for error of law
- Prospects for improving ICA, especially reducing its costs & delays

# Advantages of ICA: Takatori & Sonoo 2020 @ LTRI

## 第1部 国際商事仲裁等の現状と課題

### 1. 国際商事仲裁手続の特徴

- 仲裁手続の特徴
  - 非公開性・秘密性（confidentiality vs. transparency 先例拘束性との調整が課題）
  - 柔軟性
  - 迅速性・低コスト
  - 中立性
  - 専門性
  - 仲裁判断の執行容易性（ニューヨーク条約）

（cf. 国際調停についてのシンガポール条約）


高取芳宏「企業間紛争解決の鉄則20」（株）中央経済社、2012）70頁以下

# See also: Surveys in 1990s (Christian Buhring-Uhle) & 2000s (Shahla Ali: more Asian respondents)

Response – ‘highly relevant’ or ‘significant’	Region of Practice	
	East (Ali study)	West (CBU study)
Forum’s neutrality	88 (%)	78 (%)
Forum’s expertise	83	76
Results more predictable	36	42
Voluntary compliance*	42	24
Treaties ensure compliance abroad	85	69
Confidential procedure*	76	56
Limited discovery	47	56
No appeal	64	58
Procedure less costly	36	20
Less time consuming*	57	35
More amicable	52	35

# 1. Enforcement of arb agreements & awards

1958 New York Convention (NYC), ratified by Japan 1961! (total states: 172)



[https://uncitral.un.org/en/texts/arbitration/conventions/foreign\\_arbitral\\_awards/status2](https://uncitral.un.org/en/texts/arbitration/conventions/foreign_arbitral_awards/status2)

Art II (helps get arb started): court (eg in Japan) faced by foreign-seated arb must stay proceedings (not accept litigation), unless no agreement

Art V (helps after arb procedures ): court must enforce foreign-seated arbitration award, except if

- arb agreement void, no notice of arbitration, dispute subject matter not ‘arbitrable’, or against substantive or procedural ‘public policy’
- NB not: if error of law (or fact) by arbitrators in the award!
- BUT NB: ratifying states may make reservations to enforce only awards from other NYC member states (eg Japan), or only if arb is “commercial” (not defined in treaty, eg Korea)

# UNCITRAL Model Law on ICA 1985 (revised 2006)

- template for legislation for arbitration procedures (middle phase)
- Mostly default provisions (so parties can agree otherwise, eg 1 not 3 arbitrators)
- Key mandatory provisions: arbitrator neutrality (Art 12), ‘equal treatment and [reasonable] opportunity to be heard’ (Art 18)
- Similar provisions as NYC for enforcing international arb agreements (Art 8) and awards (Art 36), but for both foreign-seated *and* locally-seated arbs
- Plus Art 34: similarly limited grounds for *setting aside locally-seated international arb awards* in seat court
- Adopted by 74 states, including Australia (1989, basically extended from 2010 to domestic arbs) and Japan (2003, intl & domestic arbs)
  - [https://uncitral.un.org/en/texts/arbitration/modellaw/commercial\\_arbitration/status](https://uncitral.un.org/en/texts/arbitration/modellaw/commercial_arbitration/status)

# Competition from courts: still limited?

- Some states are quite generous in granting stays if parties agreed on foreign court jurisdiction, & enforcing their judgments, BUT
  - still more discretion than NYC (even Australia and Japan) & others very limited (eg no enforcement of foreign judgments in Indonesia, Thailand etc)
- Now also: Hague Choice of Court Convention 2005
  - Limited grounds, like NYC, for member states to refuse stay (Art 6) or enforcement of judgment from chosen foreign court (Art 9)
- But also eg reciprocity reservation, & anyway so far **few ratifications**
  - <https://www.hcch.net/en/instruments/conventions/status-table/?cid=98>



- Even if more ratifications, 2005 Convention does not (directly) regulate the **middle phase** of litigation in foreign court (like Model Law for ICA)
- So “international commercial courts” are being established, trying to create “arbitration-like” advantages, eg Singapore ICC in 2015??:
  - Includes foreign not just local judges (cf China ICC in 2018): neutral & expert
  - Parties may agree to limit appeals (otherwise to Singapore Court of Appeal)
  - Parties can request confidentiality of procedures
  - Parties can adopt non-Singaporean rules of evidence
  - Parties can use foreign lawyers if no Singaporean links or foreign law applies
  - Above features are like Arb, but also SICC can join third parties without consent
- But still parties rarely directly choose such courts, instead of ICA: see Man Yip et al 2023 <https://ssrn.com/abstract=4652802> (& IACL book)

## 2. Arbitrators: neutral & expert

- Choosing a foreign court (eg Switzerland) can also create neutrality, but jurisdictions change (like now Hong Kong?)
- Arbitrators can be even more neutral as individuals (but NB when three, each party usually nominates one, who then choose 3rd!)
- Parties can also choose those with subject matter expertise
  - But NB lawyers (including ex-judges) have squeezed out eg engineers etc
- More challenges to arbitrators (made to arb institutions and/or courts)
  - Due to less experienced parties, counsel, arbitrators (eg as ICA spread to Asia)?
  - Plus now push for generational change in arbitrators & (especially gender) diversity
    - So new arbitrators (seeking reappointments!) become more prone to 'due process paranoia'?

### 3. Confidentiality (mid-ranked ICA advantage)

- Now default provision in arbitration laws of many jurisdictions:
  - Eg as statutory or case law 'add on' to Model Law (eg Hong Kong, Singapore, Australia since 2015, but not eg ... Japan)
- Anyway in most institutions' Arbitration Rules (eg JCAA, TOMAC)
  - But not all: eg ICC, SCC (confidentiality duties only on arbitrators, instn)
- Confidentiality is double-edged sword:
  - Might encourage arbitrators to write shorter awards (for the parties, not the public) and manage procedures more efficiently
  - BUT seems instead to contribute to the growing costs & delays observed in ICA: parties cannot assess whether arbitrators & lawyers provide best value for money!
  - And confidential awards make predictions harder, so less chance of settlement?

## 4. Flexible procedures in ICA

- Recall: including limited pre-hearing ‘discovery’ of documents
  - But: IBA Rules on Evidence-Taking (1<sup>st</sup> in 1999) still envisage some discovery
  - So: Prague Rules 2018 (trying to promote more civil law tradition features, including more pro-active arbitrators) ... but little uptake in practice?
    - Despite eg JCAA 2019 “Interactive Arb Rules”: early clarification of issues by tribunal (*ronten seiri!*) & preliminary views before evidentiary hearing
- Other hardening, plus proliferation, of such “soft law” instruments
  - Eg IBA Guidelines on Party Representation 2013
    - Helps (especially new) arbitrators & counsel, but reduces flexibility
  - Also arb institutions increasingly provide sample documents & guidelines: see eg <https://acica.org.au/acica-practice-procedures-toolkit/>

## 5. Lack of appeal for error of law

- Still quite an attraction (recall again slide 4 above)
- Rare that parties agree to further review by arbitrators (but see eg GAFTA - for factual disputes, & AMINZ appeals – for confidentiality)
- But no appeal for error of law may make parties & lawyers more cautious during arb proceedings
- Lawyers (& even some arbitrators, eg ad hoc or in LCIA or ACICA arbitrations) also mostly operate on ‘time charge’ or ‘billable hours’ model, so less incentive to resolve cases quickly!
- Net result: growing concerns about delays & especially costs in ICA

# So: What Prospects for Improvement in ICA?

## 1. Encourage competitors for cross-border enforcement

- Ratify 2005 Hague Convention & establish (liberal) international commercial courts or hybrids (eg procedures in English)
- Promote med-arb clauses in international contracts (& also build up mediation services locally, eg JIMC, but also for domestic disputes)
  - If settlement is reached cheaply thanks to mediator, but not complied with, the dispute can escalate to arbitration (although then at a cost)
  - Ratify the Singapore Mediation Convention 2019 (like Japan already!), so any mediated settlement can be enforced with limited exceptions (like NYC Art V)
    - But few ratifications so far again, & no analogue to NYC Art II re stays if mediation agreed
  - Clarify whether compliance with the mediation step is decided by a court (as the arbitrators have no jurisdiction) or by arbitrators (deciding on 'admissibility' of the claim, which cannot be reviewed by court even if error!)

**2. Arbitrators** (and institutions): restore more professional (non-lawyer) diversity – see eg Nottage, Teramura et al 2023  
<https://ssrn.com/abstract=3926914>

**3. Confidentiality:** consider publishing redacted/anonymised

- awards (even some), and at least
- Institutions' procedural decisions (eg like LCIA, on arbitrator challenges)

**4. Flexibility in procedures:**

- promote 'competitors' to IBA 'soft law' (eg Prague Rules or variants)
- establish rules on 'Arb-Med' (parties authorise arbitrators to themselves promote settlement) eg ACICA draft Rules 2021
- Encourage 'document-only' arbs ( eg SIAC Rules 2025)

## **5. Reduce incentives to expand ‘billable hours’:**

- for arbitrator fees: eg set hourly fee but with total cap based on amount in dispute (eg JCAA general arbitration rules)
- for lawyers (& expert witnesses), 85%+ of total costs in arbs:
  - Cap based on amount in dispute (very rare in Arb Rules!)
  - encourage arbitrators or institutions to limit hourly rate to “reasonable” amount (like Anglo-Australian common law courts do), or
  - promote (Calderbank) ‘sealed offers (found in Anglo-Commonwealth litigation where also ‘costs follow the event’ ie losing party pays winner’s lawyer and witness costs): if offeree rejects offer of settlement and tribunal awards lesser amount, winning offeree cannot claim its lawyer and witness costs incurred subsequently to the offer



# Further reading:

- Luke Nottage, '*Kokusai Shoji Chusai to Lex Mercatoria no Hensen* [The Vicissitudes of Transnational Commercial Arbitration and the Lex Mercatoria]' 113 *Ho no Shihai* 100-111 (Noboru Kashiwagi, trans, 1999),
  - based on Arb Int'l (2000), and updated as chapter 2 of:
- Luke Nottage 'International Commercial and Investor-State Arbitration – Australia and Japan in Regional and Global Contexts' (Elgar 2021)
  - <https://japaneselaw.sydney.edu.au/2020/08/book-in-press-with-elgar/>
- Luke Nottage, 'Cross-Fertilisation in International Commercial Arbitration, Investor-State Arbitration and Mediation: The Good, the Bad and the Ugly?' 50(3) Monash University (2024) <https://ssrn.com/abstract=4872129>
  - originally: <https://disputescentre.com.au/supreme-court-of-new-south-wales-adr-address-2023/>
- <https://arbitrationblog.kluwerarbitration.com/author/luke-nottage/>